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THE NEW ANTI-FEDERALISM: THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE-IMPOSED LIMITS
ON CONGRESSIONAL TERMS OF OFFICE
TROY ANDREW EID*
AND JIM KOLBE**
In November 1990, Colorado voters approved a state constitutional
amendment limiting the number of consecutive terms of office that its
U.S. Senators and Representatives may serve.1 By restricting its mem-
bers of Congress to a maximum twelve years of continuous service, Col-
orado became the first state to impose term limits on federal
officeholders. 2 Supporters of the fledgling "term limitation movement"
predict the other twenty-four states that allow citizen initiatives will soon
follow Colorado's lead, pressuring Congress "to impose term limits on
itself or face the very real prospect of a constitutional convention."'
3
* Law Clerk to Judge Edith H. Jones, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit.
Member of the Colorado bar. A.B. 1986, Stanford University;J.D. 1991, The University of
Chicago.
** U.S. Representative from Arizona, 1984 to present. B.A. 1965, Northwestern
University; M.B.A. 1967, Stanford University; member, House Committee on Appropria-
tions, Subcommittee on State, Commerce and the Judiciary; and the House Budget Com-
mittee. A county supervisor's efforts to challenge Kolbe in the 1982 Republican primary
election led to Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002
(1983) (upholding Arizona's "resign-to-run" requirement for state officeholders seeking
election to Congress). Joyner is discussed infra notes 300-306 and accompanying text.
Highlights of this article appeared in The Wall Street Journal. See Jim Kolbe, Term
Limits are Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1992, at A15.
The authors thank Michael W. McConnell, Jonathan R. Macey, Allison Hartwell Eid,
and Richard A. "Rowdy" Yeates for their help with earlier drafts. Thanks also to Sandra
L. Eid for research assistance; Theresa Peterson for secretarial services; the law firm of
Holme, Roberts & Owen in Denver, Colorado; and the Bradley Foundation and the Pro-
gram in Law & Government at The University of Chicago Law School.
1. The initiative, Amendment 5, also imposed term limits on members of the Colo-
rado General Assembly and top executive branch officials. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE
COLORADO GENERAL ASSEMBLY, AN ANALYSIS OF 1990 BALLOT PROPOSALS 19 (Research
Publication No. 350, 1990) [hereinafter LEGIS. COUNCIL ANALYSIS].
2. See, e.g., U.S. NEws & WORLD REP.,July 29, 1991, at 6; WALL ST.J.,July 17, 1991,
at Al0; John Andrews, Colorado's Term Limitation an Example for Rest of Nation, THE CAPITOL
REP. (Denver), April 29, 1991, at 8 ("Coloradans can take pride that our state stands alone,
first in the union and leading the way for all the other states, on returning the Congress
from the arrogance of permanent incumbency to the responsiveness of a citizen legisla-
ture."). In contrast, a term limitation initiative approved the same day by California vot-
ers, Proposition 140, applies solely to state officials. See N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1990, at B9.
Oklahoma also approved state term limits. Neal Pierce, Term Limitation Movement Shakes Up
the Political Establishment, DENY. POST, Sept. 23, 1990, at 4D. Unless otherwise indicated,
this article uses the phrases "term limits" and "term limitation" solely to denote restric-
tions on the eligibility of members of Congress to seek re-election; it does not refer to
similar restrictions on state officeholders.
3. Edward H. Crane, Term Limitation: The End of the Imperial Congress, CATO POL'Y REP.,
Nov./Dec. 1990, at 2. For an excellent overview of the term limitation movement and its
agenda, seejeffery L. Katz, The Uncharted Realm of Term Limitation, GOVERNING,Jan. 1991, at
34. See also James K. Coyne, Term Limitation: Bringing Change, Competition, Control and Chal-
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The movement, loosely coordinated by two national organizations,
Americans to Limit Congressional Terms (ALCT) and Citizens for Con-
gressional Reform (CCR), has won the backing of several prominent
political commentators, 4 the Republican Party,5 and President George
Bush, who carried the issue to the states in 1990 while campaigning in
state and congressional elections.6 Supporters report that grassroots
term limit campaigns are now underway in at least twenty states, 7 and
several national opinion polls suggest most Americans favor congres-
sional term limitation.
8
A driving force behind the'movement's popular appeal is the rela-
tively low turnover in Congress in recent years. Many commentators
from across the political spectrum see today's high rates of incumbency
as symptomatic of a failing democracy. 9 Modern incumbency rates of
lenges to Congress, 331 THE HERITAGE LECTURES 1 (1991). Thus far, the movement has been
unsuccessful in persuading Congress to restrict its own tenure. Six measures were intro-
duced in the 101st Congress to limit terms of office, none of which passed either house.
LEGIS. COUNCIL ANALYSIS at 21. By comparison, during the first six months of 1991, 148
bills were introduced in 45 states to limit the terms of political officeholders ranging from
members of Congress to county commissioners. CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 29, 1991,
at 8.
4. A few notable examples include Richard Cohen of The Washington Post and syn-
dicated columnists Ellen Goodman and Richard Reeves. SeeJohn H. Fund, Liberals for Term
Limits, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1991, at A16.
5. The GOP endorsed congressional term limits in its 1988 party platform. Memo-
randum from Sula P. Richardson, Library of Congress, Congressional Tenure: A Review of
Efforts to Limit House and Senate Service 11 (Sept. 13, 1989) [hereinafter Richardson].
6. See On the Record, NAT'L REV., Nov. 19, 1990 at 1.0; Fred Barnes, Quayle Alert; Bush
Health Troubles and Public Worries About the Vice President, NEW REPUBLIC, May 27, 1991, at I 1
(crediting Vice President Quayle with "clearing the way" for the President's subsequent
endorsement of congressional term limitation). Bush is not the first President to favor
term limitation. Presidents Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy also backed proposals to
limit congressional tenure. See Mark P. Petracca, The Poison of Professional Politics, 151 CATO
INST. POL'Y ANALYSIS 21 (May 10, 1991).
7. See CHI. TRIB.,July 14, 1991, at C13. According to ALCT, the states most likely to
vote on congressional term limitation in 1992 are Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Maine, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota and Wyoming. PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, July 7, 1991,
reported in AM. POL. NETWORK HOTLINE, July 10, 1991. Petitions have already been filed in
Massachusetts, see BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 8, 1991, at 34. Term limit activity has also been
reported in Alaska, Georgia, Texas and Wisconsin, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, supra, and in
South Carolina, USA TODAY, Mar. 12, 1991, at 6A.
The term limitation movement suffered a setback in November, 1991, when voters in
Washington State unexpectedly rejected Initiative 553, which would have limited the
terms of the state's congressional delegation. See Deborah Privitera, Washington State's De-
feat of Term Limits Stirs Debate, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 17, 1991, at 26A. Unlike the measure
approved last year in Colorado, Initiative 553 would have applied retroactively. Its "three-
terms-and-out" rule would have involuntarily retired House Speaker Thomas S. Foley-
and every other member of Washington's House delegation-in 1994. Ronald D. Elving,
National Drive to Limit Terms Casts Shadow over Congress, CONG. Q., Oct. 26, 1991, at 3101.
Arguing that the initiative was unconstitutional, Foley and others initially tried to exclude
553 from the November ballot. The Washington Supreme Court, however, denied their
request, holding that there was not enough time to consider the issue. See Dan Balz, Wash-
ington State Voters Weigh Term Limits for Elected Officials, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 8, 1991, at 15A.
8. For instance, 70% of the respondents to a Gallup Poll conducted for the National
Foundation of Independent Business in December 1989 and January 1990 favored such
limits. See Mike Kelly, Limit Terms, Expand Democracy, INDEPENDENCE ISSUE PAPER No. 10-90
(Independence Institute, Golden, Colo.) July 18, 1990, at 1.
9. Compare, for example, the sentiment expressed in a fundraising letter written by
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near 90% are the highest since the middle of President George Wash-
ington's first term.1 0 During the early 1800s, congressional turnover per
election increased substantially. By the time of the Civil War, fewer
than 2% of House members served more than twelve years. Overall, re-
election rates in the 19th Century ranged from between 40% and 70%,
with an all-time low of 24% in 1842.12 After World War I, re-election
rates surpassed 70%o and have generally been climbing ever since.
13
Most recently, despite predictions that voters would vent their frus-
trations in the 1990 congressional elections, 96% of incumbent U.S.
Representatives and Senators prevailed in their re-election bids, com-
pared to 98% in 1988 and 1986, and 95% in 1984.14 One journalist
spoke for many by observing that "the power of incumbency for those
on Capitol Hill proved considerable even in the face of populist
rumblings.... [N]ot many of the rascals were thrown out, for all the
hullabaloo." 1 5 However, low turnover in the 1990 elections-and the
unwillingness of Congress to impose term limits on itself-has
prompted activists to carry their campaign to the states with an intensity
that would have been unthinkable only a few years ago.
Term limit opponents, taken aback by the movement's sudden
strength, warn that such restrictions would deprive Congress of badly
needed leadership and expertise.1 6 Many of the movement's critics
Republican State Senator Terry Considine, chairman of Colorado's term-limit campaign
organization ("Democracy in America is in trouble.... We have learned through bitter
experience that Thomas Jefferson was right when he warned that professional politicians
are a danger to American liberty and prosperity.") (Sept. 12, 1990) (on file with the au-
thors) with the views of liberal pundit Lewis H. Lapham:
Mhe politicians in the Capitol speak with only one voice, which is the voice of
the oligarchy that buys the airline tickets and television images ... the voice of
only one kind of functionary: a full-time politician, nearly always a lawyer, who
spends at least 80 percent of his time raising campaign funds and construes his
function as that of a freight-forwarding agent redistributing the national income
into venues convenient to his owners and friends.
Lewis H. Lapham, Democracy in America? Not Only the Economy is in Decline, HARPER'S MAG.,
Nov. 1990, at 47, 52-53.
Indeed, the Wall Street Journal's John Fund has recently documented the growing
popularity of term limitation among liberal Democrats, many of whom see the movement
as a means of removing moderate and conservative incumbents from Congress. Left-of-
center public figures who call themselves term-limit supporters include former California
Governor and presidential candidate Edmund G. "Jerry" Brown, Jr.; former U.S. Repre-
sentative Shirley Chisholm; and activist Ralph Nader. Fund, supra note 4.
10. Hendrik Hertzberg, Twelve is Enough, NEw REPUBLIC, May 14, 1990, at 23.
11. See generally JAMES STERLING YOUNG, THE WASHINGTON COMMUNITY, 1800-1828
(1966).
12. John H. Fund, There's No Debate-The Career Congress Lives, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11,
1991, at A14.
13. Hertzberg, supra note 10.
14. Had nationwide term limitation been enacted twelve years ago, it would now dis-
qualify 347o of Congress's current members. Id. From 1977 to 1989, for example, turno-
ver in the U.S. House and Senate averaged 62% and 53%, respectively. See Karl T. Kurtz,
Limiting Terms of Office Would Cripple State Legislatures, DENY. POST, Sept. 23, 1990, at 4D.
15. R.W. Apple,Jr., The Big Vote Is for 'No', N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1990 at Al, B6. How-
ever, the margin of re-election for many incumbents was narrower in 1990 than in other
elections of the recent past. In particular, the number of House incumbents re-elected
with 60%o of the vote or less was twice as high as two years before. See id.
16. See, e.g., David S. Broder, Term Limits Could Cause a Brain Drain, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 18,
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share its desire for congressional reform, especially of campaign financ-
ing laws that shield incumbents from viable challengers. 17 But critics
fear term limits would hurt the democratic process by increasing the
clout of political action committees and special-interest groups in shap-
ing national legislation.' 8 Less-experienced legislators, they argue,
would be even more dependent on private lobbyists for guidance; term
limits prevent voters from retaining veteran legislators who have served
them well in the past. 19
To further their cause, term limit foes have formed Let the People
Decide, a group based in Washington, D.C. and headed by Melvin R.
Laird, a former U.S. Representative and Secretary of Defense under
President Nixon.20 Just as the movement's supporters hail from across
the political spectrum, its critics range from organized labor groups such
as the AFL-CIO, to former Reagan Administration officials William
Bradford Reynolds and Bruce Fein.2 1 The result has been one of the
most interesting political discussions in recent years.
Ironically, both sides have mostly ignored the federal constitutional
implications that should be central to the term limit debate. The Colo-
rado amendment obliquely raised the possibility that term limits may be
unconstitutional by encouraging "the federal officials elected from Col-
orado to voluntarily observe" 22 the limits on congressional terms of of-
1990, § 4, at 3; Pat M. Holt, Term Limits Would Throw Out the Able with the Inept, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MoNIToR, Jan. 3, 1991, at 19.
17. See, e.g., David S. Broder, A Reluctant Voice for Campaign Reform, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 9,
1990, § 4, at 3; Thomas E. Cronin, Term Limits-A Symptom, Not a Cure, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23,
1990, at Eli. It is interesting to note that in every congressional election since 1974,
when the current federal campaign finance system was enacted, at least 90% of incum-
bents seeking re-election were retained. Hertzberg, supra note 10, at 23.
18. See, e.g., Eleanor Clift, Term Limits Won't Work, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 11, 1991, at 30.
Clift notes that "unless term limits are accompanied by campaign-finance reform, legisla-
tors would still be dependent on PAC [political action committee] money." Id at 30-31.
Others charge that the term limit movement is itself driven by special interests, noting that
CCR received its seed money-about $400,000-from brothers Charles G. and David H.
Koch, chairman and executive vice-president, respectively, of Koch Industries, Inc., a pri-
vately held, diversified energy company in Wichita, Kansas. Paula Dwyer, Term Limits: Pop-
ular Revolt or Extremist Crusade?, Bus. WK., Nov. 11, 1991, at 40. Dwyer concludes: "[Tihe
reality doesn't bear out the populist myth. The term-limit crusade may have begun as a
citizens' movement. But it has been taken over by big money." Id. See generally Bill
Hornby, Terms Limits Involve People in High Places, DENY. POST, Nov. 5, 1991, at A20.
19. See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, Why Americans Hate Politicians, TIME, Dec. 9, 1991,
at 92. Krauthammer concludes: "The case for term limits rests on the proposition that if
you scramble eggs, you reduce the cholesterol. Throwing out today's rascals is cathartic
but hardly a solution. There is not a shred of evidence that newer, less experienced politi-
cians will make more effective legislators." Id.
20. David S. Broder, Labor, Laird to Oppose Term Limits, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1991, at
AS. Like Laird's group, ALCT is chaired by a former GOP House member, James K.
Coyne.
21. Id.; Bruce Fein & William B. Reynolds, Term Limits: Why Oust Good Incumbents?
TEX. LAW., Dec. 17, 1990, at 24. See also Bruce Fein, From California, A Troubling Ruling on
Term Limits, Id., Nov. 4, 1991, at 15.
22. LEGIS. COUNCIL ANALYSIS, supra note 1 (text of amendment) (emphasis added). A
brochure distributed to voters by the Colorado term limit campaign organization explains
that the constitutionality of its proposal "is an unsettled area of constitutional law."
COLORADANS BACK IN CHARGE, RESPONSES TO CONCERNS ABOUT TERM LIMITATIONS (un-
dated) (on file with the authors) [hereinafter TERM LIMrrATIONS]. Given this uncertainty,
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fice should the courts later invalidate them. Thus far, however, the term
limitation movement and its critics have confined their dialogue to pub-
lic policy arguments without reference to the Constitution's text, struc-
ture and history, or to the U.S. Supreme Court decisions that bear on
the question. As this article concludes, there is strong reason to believe
that congressional term limits are unconstitutional. The reluctance of
some movement leaders to confront this fact creates false expectations
among voters who support such restrictions. Voters who believe states
can limit congressional terms without running afoul of the U.S. Consti-
tution are likely to be disappointed.
As section I of this article shows, the framers of the Constitution
considered and rejected term limits for members of Congress. Several
prominent Anti-Federalists advocated such restrictions for Congress as
well as for the President, and the delegates at the Constitutional Con-
vention considered proposals to this effect. 23 Yet the framers voted to
delete term limits from the final text of the Constitution, apparently be-
cause they believed other institutional safeguards, such as frequent elec-
tions, would be sufficient to control congressional abuses of power.
24
Moreover, neither the states nor Congress may impose such limits
without impermissibly adding to the Constitution's standing qualifica-
tions for congressional service. As section II of this article argues, the
founders intended for the Standing Qualifications Clauses in Article 125
to be the exclusive list of restrictions on congressional eligibility. Sec-
tion III notes that the Tenth Congress rejected one state's attempt to
"superadd" qualifications to its U.S. Representatives in 1807, and while
later Congresses have occasionally imposed their own membership qual-
ifications, the Supreme Court has since limited this practice. 2 6 The sec-
"[t]he language used in drafting the term limit proposal makes it plain that the federal
term limits can be severed from the rest of the bill, so if the federal term limits are chal-
lenged in court, and the court throws them out, that action would have no effect on the
rest of the measure." Id.
23. See infra notes 71-82 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 83-96 and accompanying text.
25. These clauses establish age, residency and citizenship requirements for U.S. Rep-
resentatives and Senators. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cI. 2 (Representatives must be twenty-
five years of age, have seven years' citizenship in the United States, and state residency);
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (Senators must be thirty years of age, have nine years' resi-
dency in the United States, and state residency).
26. Article I, Section 5, Clause 1 of the Constitution provides that "Each House Shall
be the judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members." Congress
has relied on this section to establish procedures for governing disputed elections. 2
U.S.C. §§ 381-96 (1982). See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 97
(1988). In its most recent decision, however, the U.S. Supreme Court rebuffed Congress's
efforts to use Article I, Section 5 to create new substantive qualifications for its members.
The decision, Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), is discussed infra notes 227-43
and accompanying text. Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment creates a narrow exception,
now of only historical interest, to the Standing Qualifications of Article I:
No person shall be a Senator or Representative of Congress . . . who, having
previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress ... to support the Constitu-
tion of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against
the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a
vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
1992]
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tion also addresses Thomas Jefferson's suggestion that states retain the
power under the Tenth Amendment 2 7 to impose additional qualifica-
tions on their federal representatives. Jefferson's view does not ade-
quately address the fact that federal power comes directly from the
people, through the Constitution, rather than from the states. Because
the Constitution fixes the standing qualifications for U.S. Representa-
tives and Senators, the states do not retain powers they never had.
The article closes in section IV by examining a theory that is rapidly
gaining popularity among term limit supporters: that Article I, Section
4,28 which empowers Congress and the states to regulate "the Times,
Places and Manner" of congressional elections, also permits them to de-
clare incumbent U.S. Senators and Representatives ineligible to stand
for re-election.2 9 We conclude that neither the states nor Congress can
use the Times, Places, and Manner Clause as a vehicle to read the stand-
ing qualifications out of Article I because the Clause applies solely to
federal election procedures, and not to the substance of office-holding.
Whatever the merits of congressional term limits, they will become
a reality only through an amendment to the U.S. Constitution, rather
than through piecemeal, state-imposed measures.3 0 If term limitation
supporters are serious about achieving their objectives, they should fo-
cus on the constitutional amendment process. 3 ' Although Congress
could propose a constitutional amendment, it is unlikely to limit its own
terms-a reality of which term limit supporters are keenly aware.
3 2
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3. See generally P. Allen Dionisopoulos, A Commentary on the
Constitutional Issues in the Powell and Related Cases, 17J. PUB. L. 103, 111-15 (1968).
27. U.S. CONsT. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.").
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except
as to the Places of chusing Senators.").
29. For arguments in favor of reading a substantive component into the Times, Places
and Manner Clause, see, e.g., Steven Glazier, Each State Can Limit Re-Election to Congress,
WALL ST.J.,June 19, 1990, at A20; Editorial, Elections That Count, WALL ST.J.,July 5, 1990,
at A1O (supporting Glazier); and Miles C. Cortez & Christopher T. Macaulay, The Constitu-
tionality of Term Limitation, 19 CoLo. LAw. 2193, 2196 (Nov. 1990).
30. This is not to say, however, that the movement toward state-imposed term limita-
tion has had no political effect. Indeed, some commentators believe the term limitation
movement is primarily responsible for Congress's renewed interest in.campaign finance
reform. Keith White, Senate Grapples with Campaign Finance Reform, Gannett News Service,
May 19, 1991, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, GNS file (citing pressure created by the
Colorado amendment on Senate efforts to reform federal campaign finance laws).
31. A constitutional amendment can be proposed in one of two ways. First, Congress
can propose an amendment "whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it neces-
sary .... U.S. CONST., art. V. Alternatively, Congress "shall call a Convention for pro-
posing Amendments" if asked to do so by two-thirds of the states. Id An amendment
proposed through either method becomes part of the Constitution after it has been rati-
fied by three-fourths of the states. Id. For an overview of the constitutional convention
amendment process, see JAMES E. BOND, DAVID E. ENGDAHL & HENRY N. BUTLER, THE
CONSTrrTUTIONAL CONVErrIoN (Nat'l. Legal Ctr. for the Pub. Interest, Oct. 1987).
32. See comments of CCR President Paul Becker, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1991, at A4
("Congress probably finds any limit to their terms unacceptable. We know we must go
around Congress and impose strict limits.").
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Term limit supporters should concentrate on obtaining the thirty-four
states needed to convene a constitutional convention, instead of engag-
ing in costly and time-consuming deliberations over initiatives like Colo-
rado's that cannot pass muster in the courts, regardless of their merits as
public policy.
I. TERM LIMrrs AND THE FOUNDING
Prior to the 1990 Colorado initiative, no state had ever limited the
number of consecutive terms of office its members of Congress could
serve.3 3 Arguments for and against congressional term limits, however,
are as old as the United States. In 1776, Thomas Jefferson proposed a
resolution in the Continental Congress urging the states to restrict their
representatives to two years of service. 34 just as many of today's reform-
ers believe that low turnover in Congress threatens democracy, Jeffer-
son warned:
To prevent every danger which might arise to American free-
dom by continuing too long in office the members of the Conti-
nental Congress, to preserve to that body the confidence of
their friends, and to disarm the malignant imputation of their
enemies: It is earnestly recommended to the several provinces,
assemblies or conventions of the United Colonies, that in their
future elections of delegates to the Continental Congress, one
half, at least, of the persons chosen be such as were not of the
delegation preceding, and the residue be of such as shall not
have served in that office longer than two years.3 5
Jefferson's colleagues defeated his resolution.
3 6
There is no record of the debate over the resolution. Yet, assuming
a majority of members opposed term limitation, they acted consistently
with the English tradition. Members of the British House of Commons,
who then served seven-year terms, were eligible to seek re-election.
37
Jefferson, then, was pressing an idea that must have seemed novel at the
time.
In designing their system of separated and enumerated powers, the
founders did not entirely reject the English experience. Instead, they
incorporated many of its best features into the framework for their new
republic, while designing safeguards to prevent oppression. Bothieffer-
33. See Kelly, supra note 8, at 6.
34. Id. at 8.
35. Id
36. Id. at 9. Notably, however, Jefferson's home state of Virginia seems to have fol-
lowed his advice, at least in part. The following year, Virginia's legislature approved a
resolution providing that "[n]o person who shall have served two years in Congress, shall
be capable of serving therein again, till he shall have been out of the same one whole
year." Id.
37. See, e.g., 10 WILLIAM HOLDSWORrH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 598 (1938). By
comparison, membership in the House of Lords, which the Federalists derided as a "he-
reditary assembly of opulent nobles," was not limited to a specific length of time. THE
FEDERALIST No. 63, at 430 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (responding to
Anti-Federalist criticism that the proposed Senate, with its six-year terms, would create an
aristocracy similar to the House of Lords).
1992]
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son and the framers of the Constitution hoped to spare the emerging
nation from the sort of tyranny that dominated Parliament under King
George III. Yet, just as Jefferson's fellow members of the Continental
Congress defeated his term limitation resolution, so too did the dele-
gates at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 reject such restrictions
in the text of the final document.
A. The Imperial Parliament
The American Colonists were keenly aware of what legal historian
William Holdsworth has called the "imperial Parliament" of King
George 111,38 for they were its victims. Their rallying cry of "taxation
without representation" helped spark a revolution.3 9 But the men who
would become the founding fathers also had more specific grievances
against Parliament, including the so-called standing incapacities, which
denied membership in Parliament to the vast majority of the British
population; a system of elections that legitimated bribery and corrup-
tion; and the House of Commons' self-proclaimed right to refuse to seat
even duly elected members without justification.
40
Practically speaking, George III's subjects could claim a "House of
Commons" in name only. His kingdom's unwritten constitution-that
is, its parliamentary customs and traditions, augmented by statute-ren-
dered most classes of persons completely ineligible to be House mem-
bers, let alone vote. The standing incapacities recognized in Great
Britain at the time of America's Declaration of Independence included
certain members of the clergy, women, aliens, minors, persons attainted
of treason or felony, judges who sat in the House of Lords, Royal of-
ficers and tax collectors, and sheriffs, mayors and bailiffs seeking to rep-
resent their own jurisdictions.4 1 Moreover, a statute passed during the
reign of Queen Anne in 1710 required that members hold certain
38. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at 559.
39. At the Stamp Act Congress of 1765, the Colonists rejected "virtual representa-
tion," the doctrine by which the Crown claimed the right to tax them without formal repre-
sentation in Parliament. English defenders of the Stamp Act had insisted that the
Colonists were no different than other disenfranchised persons living in the kingdom, such
as women and non-freeholders: "All British Subjects . . . are virtually represented in Par-
liament; for every Member of Parliament sits in the House, not as Representative of his
own Constituents, but as one of that august Assembly by which all the Commons of Great
Britain are represented." THOMAS WHATELY, THE REGULATIONS LATELY MADE CONCERNING
THE COLONIES AND THE TAXES IMPOSED UPON THEM, CONSIDERED 104-109 (London, 1765),
reprinted in EDMUND S. MORGAN & HELEN M. MORGAN, THE STAMP ACT CRISIS 106 (1963)
(emphasis in original). In response, the delegates to the Stamp Act Congress declared
"that no Taxes be imposed on [his Majesty's Subjects in these Colonies], but with their
own Consent, given personally, or by their Representatives .... [Tihe people of these
Colonies are not, and from their local Circumstances cannot be, Represented in the House
of Commons in Great Britain." Declarations of the Stamp Act Congress, Oct. 7-24, in Proceedings of
the Congress at New York (Annapolis, 1766), reprinted in MORGAN, supra at 143.
40. This latter point arose in the notorious case of John Wilkes, a popular member
whom the House of Commons expelled for seditious libel in 1769 and later refused to seat
even after he was re-elected three times. See infra notes 135-150 and accompanying text.
41. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES 169-70 (1765), cited in 2 THE FOUN-




amounts and types of property. The statute, which aimed at preserving
the ascendancy of the landed gentry in the House of Commons, re-
mained in force until 1838.42 Finally, members were required to swear
an oath whose religious tenets effectively barred service by Roman
Catholics, Quakers and Jews. 43 The standing incapacities helped pro-
duce a legislature so homogenous that "it often happened that a seat in
the House of Commons became as hereditary as an estate or as a seat in
the House of Lords."
44
England's election system reinforced this homogeneity. Despite
several anemic attempts at reform, the buying and selling of seats in the
House of Commons persisted on a massive scale throughout the 18th
century. In counties and boroughs alike, a handful of wealthy landown-
ers, nobles and wealthy merchants, loosely known as patrons, wielded
almost plenary power over the election process. The patrons not only
selected House candidates and funded their campaigns, but sometimes
"elected" them without any polling.45 The elections themselves were
mostly pro forma, returning the patrons' relatives and friends to office
time and again. As one historian has noted:
Of no less than 30 among the 80 knights of the shires returned
in 1761, the fathers had previously represented the same coun-
ties, while another 19 had been preceded by more distant an-
cestors in the direct male line; together 49 out of 80 can be said
to have inherited their seats. Of another 20, ancestors in the
direct male line had sat in Parliament, though for different con-
stituencies, and only 11 were without Parliamentary ancestry in
the male line.
4 6
The most influential patrons exerted a disproportionate impact
over an already corrupt process. For instance, an observer of the elec-
tions of 1780 claimed that the two or three wealthiest patrons in Great
Britain controlled nearly one-quarter of all members elected to Parlia-
ment.4 7 If the patrons in every county were to unite, he continued, "they
could nominate every county member except one."4 8 By another con-
temporary estimate, 307 members-a majority of the House-were re-
turned to Parliament by only 154 persons.4 9 So thoroughly did the
borough patrons dominate elections that a market developed in House
seats, which sold at an average price of £2,000 each by 1761.50
Members of Parliament shared in the spoils of the system. At a time
when government service was mostly unpaid, and purchasing a seat ex-
42. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at 553-54.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 557.
45. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 37, at 557-58. During the 18th century, there were 513
English and Welsh members of the House of Commons. Of these, 94 represented the
counties, 415 the boroughs, and 4 the universities of Oxford and Cambridge. Id. at 563.
46. Id. at 557 n.5 (citing historian Lewis B. Namier).
47. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at 557.
48. Id.
49. IM at 576 n.3.
50. Id. at 576.
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pensive, many members expected to profit handsomely during their ten-
ure. Members who bought their seats expected to see their money back
in the shape of an office, appointment or commendation, a pension, or
simply a cash payment.5 1 As one Whig who had served seventeen years
in the House wrote in 1757, "I have ever apprehended it to be reason-
able that those who dedicate their time and fortune to the service of the
Government should be entitled to a share of the rewards that are in its
disposal .... 52 Nor was the national treasury the sole source of a mem-
ber's wealth. The patrons who sold members their seats often rein-
vested the proceeds to support the members in office. This helped
defray not only the expense of members' gifts to voters and local offi-
cials both during and after the campaign, but also the costs of the elec-
tion itself.
53
This last point bears repeating. Challengers not only had to fund
their own campaigns, but were expected to help pay for the polls as well.
Not surprisingly, truly contested elections were infrequent, but those
that did occur-usually between rival noble families or merchant inter-
ests-were expensive. A host of election officials, representing both the
Crown and local authorities, routinely exacted various fees for their
services without any statutory authority. 54 For patrons who could afford
the initial investment, however, a successful election was often well
worth the cost; they could expect to see the resources of the central
government diverted to their parochial interests. Given the high stakes,
patrons whose boroughs dared show independence at the polls risked
painful consequences. Such was the case, for instance, when the Duke
of Newcastle's candidate was rejected at Lewes in 1768:
IT]he tenants who had voted for Colonel Hay, the successful
candidate, were given notice to quit at Michaelmas. The con-
stables at Lewes were informed that his Grace withdrew his in-
terest from the town, that he would no longer contribute to
their entertainments, as he had been accustomed to do, that the
plate which they had on loan from him for use on ceremonial
occasions was to be returned. He would refrain from his usual
endeavors to have the assizes fixed at Lewes. All tradesmen
who had dared to vote against him were forthwith to lose his
custom. If there were rewards for compliance, there was the
risk of incurring severe penalties in case of disobedience .... 55
By offering this brief introduction to a few of the abuses of the Eng-
lish Parliament at the time of the American Revolution, we do not mean
to suggest that every member of Parliament was corrupt, that all elec-
tions were rigged, or that the rest of society was indifferent to the mis-
chief it observed. On the contrary, a rising chorus of reformers, among
51. Id. at 580.
52. Id. at 578 n.l.
53. Id. at 577. Consequently, brokering seats was primarily a means for the patrons to
gain access to favorable legislation and other government benefits; it was seldom profita-
ble in itself.
54. Id. at 571.
55. Id. at 576 n.2.
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them such prominent figures as Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham, de-
manded various changes to parliamentary practice and procedure.
5 6
One reformer of particular interest is Richard Price, whose 1776
pamphlet, Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty,57 sharply criticized
England's treatment of the Colonists. Price called for shortening the
length of the seven-year parliamentary session,58 a proposal which
would undermine the patrons-the driving force behind parliamentary
corruption-by making it more expensive to broker elections. Many pa-
trons already found it unduly costly and time-consuming to manage
elections once every seven years. 59 More frequent elections would di-
minish patron control over the election process. This, in turn, might
lead to serious competition for House seats. In theory, at least, even
challengers with modest financial backing could wage. credible
campaigns..
Although figures such as William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, also favored
shorter parliamentary sessions, 60 the reform movement languished as
George III consolidated power. A few members who engaged in the
most flagrant abuses were punished, but Parliament as an institution
went unchanged. Chatham captured the frustration of many when he
wrote in 1771 that "the whole constitution is a shadow."
6 1
The failure of the reform movement in England also had profound
consequences for the Colonists. The leaders of the American Revolu-
tion-many of the same men who would later become the Federalists
and Anti-Federalists-were well-acquainted with the larger pattern of
parliamentary corruption which touched their everyday lives.6 2 Thus, it
was no accident that the founders crafted a constitution with numerous
checks and balances on Congress's authority, including dramatically
shorter terms for what was then its "popular branch," the House of
Representatives.
63
In contrast, the Constitution did not expressly disqualify incum-
bents from running in those same elections. Jefferson's term limit reso-
lution of 1776, and similar proposals that followed, show that the
founders had ample opportunity to restrict incumbency if they had so
56. Id. at 117.
57. RICHARD PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY, THE PRINCIPLES
OF JUSTICE AND POLICY OF THE WAR WrrH AMERICA (Feb. 8, 1776).
58. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at 117. See generally PRICE, supra note 57.
59. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at 577. Indeed, it was the rise of the aristocracy in
the House of Commons that led to the passage of the Septennial Act, which lengthened
parliamentary sessions from three to seven years. The Act was unpopular with the public
for another reason: it entitled the members who enacted it, who had been elected for
three-year terms, to serve another four years without any elections. See also THE FEDERAL-
IST No. 53, at 61 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)(discussing the transcendent
and uncontrolled authority of Parliament).
60. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at 100, 102 n.4.
61. Id. at 101 n.1.
62. As Holdsworth concludes, "[t]his Parliamentary tyranny . . . was the principal
cause of the American war of independence." Id. at 102.
63. Until the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, the state legislatures
chose the Senators who represented their states in Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, c. 2.
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desired. The absence of a term limitation provision in the final docu-
ment ratified by the states suggests a continuation of the English tradi-
tion, whereby legislators remained eligible for re-election as the voters
saw fit. The events surrounding the Constitutional Convention, and the
deliberations themselves, reinforce this view.
B. Federalists, Anti-Federalists and the Convention
In 1777, the Articles of Confederation limited congressional dele-
gates to three years of service.64 Prior to that time, the states re-elected
those delegates who wished to continue serving in Congress "almost as
a matter of course."'6 5 More importantly, the Constitution that replaced
the Articles in 1789 did not incorporate any such restrictions on incum-
bency. This omission is all the more striking because the original draft
of the Constitution, the so-called Virginia Plan offered by Edmund Ran-
dolph, declared U.S. Representatives "to be incapable of re-election for
the space of - after the expiration of their term of service ... .
Rather than fill in this blank space as the Convention progressed,
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina moved to eliminate the provision
64. Because the Articles were not ratified until 1781, the term limitation provision
contained in Article 5 "did not actually take effect until 1784, when a handful of members
became ineligible for re-election." JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLI-
TIcS: AN INTERPRETATIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 218 (1979). Professor
Rakove notes that even if Article 5 had taken effect earlier, it would have been virtually
irrelevant to the actual composition of Congress:
Of the 235 delegates who attended Congress for a minimal period of four weeks
during any one calendar year between 1774 and 1783, 56 appeared in Congress
during one year only, another 65 were present during each of two years, while a
mere 53 attended during each of three.... [OInly 31 delegates, or one-eighth of
our total, served in Congress during each of the calendar years or more. By the
end of 1776, more than half of those who had attended Congress prior to the
Declaration of Independence had left its chambers for good.
Id.
Against this statistical backdrop, Rakove concludes that the term limitation provision
in Article 5 "clearly reflected the Americans' early commitment to the republican principle
of rotation in office, and in that sense may also have been a mark of the naivete with which
they initially weighed the merits of experience in government against the dangers of en-
trenched power." Id. He observes, for instance, that the vast majority of delegates who
served between 1774 and 1783 had extensive government experience; four out of five had
held office at the colony or statewide level. Id. at 224. Nonetheless, few of them wanted to
stay in Congress for very long. Many members found it difficult to serve in Congress
during wartime, and the job itself was extraordinarily expensive. Delegates were forced to
travel to sessions in such cities as Baltimore, Philadelphia and New York, taking them away
from their homes, families, livelihoods and, in many instances, their political careers in the
states, which in many ways were far more powerful than the central government. Id. at
236. Rakove concludes that "[tihe exercise of power was tedious, fatiguing, and damaging
to [the delegates'] private interests. So long as most delegates thought their attendance a
concession to patriotism rather than the fulfillment of their ambitions, Congress would be
condemned to muddling through to independence." Id at 238.
65. THE FEDERALIST No. 53, at 364-65 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
66. JAMES MADISON, NoTEs OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 31
(Adrienne Koch, ed., 1966)(footnotes omitted)[hereinafter NoTEs]. Randolph offered this
draft on May 29, 1787, and it became the Convention's working plan. Significantly, the
Virginia Plan did not include term limits for Senators, an idea endorsed by at least one
Anti-Federalist. See infra text accompanying note 80.
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entirely. The delegates agreed and voted unanimously to delete the
term limit provision.
6 7
There are at least two plausible explanations for why the framers
failed to include congressional term limits in the final draft of the Con-
stitution.68 According to the first theory, the framers were largely am-
bivalent toward federal term limitation, preferring to let the states or
Congress settle the matter later, if at all. Adherents of this view stress
that while the Constitution does not expressly provide for federal term
limits, neither does it expressly prohibit states or Congress from impos-
ing such restrictions. 6 9 The second explanation, in contrast, is that the
founders deliberately rejected term limits for both Congress and the
President, so that the Constitution ratified in 1789 forbids both Con-
gress and the states from imposing such restrictions on federal
officeholders.
We conclude that the second explanation is more historically accu-
rate. In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize that it is sometimes dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to know the framers' precise intentions toward a
given subject. The founders, after all, were political leaders with diverse
interests and agendas. They left an incomplete paper trail for historians
trying to piece together their thinking on many matters, and they simply
could not have foreseen all of the challenges their democracy would face
in future years. Nonetheless, the framers expressly considered congres-
sional term limitation. While the available evidence is not entirely un-
ambiguous, on balance it strongly suggests the founders rejected such
restrictions.
1. Term Limits and the Anti-Federalist Agenda.
The campaign against ratifying the Constitution was already under-
way when the Convention met in May 1787. By September, the Anti-
Federalists had added several prominent Convention delegates to their
ranks, and details of the closed-door negotiations at Philadelphia were
being replayed in the public press.70 The Federalists struck back quickly.
67. I at 109; 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 248 (Max
Farrand ed., 1937) [hereinafter Farrand].
68. By offering these two explanations, we do not mean to suggest that they are the
only possible interpretations of what happened at the Constitutional Convention. Our
purpose, rather, is to draw a basic distinction between: 1) an account of history in which
the Convention delegates did not forbid the states or Congress from imposing term limita-
tion on members of Congress; and 2) an account of history in which the Convention dele-
gates not only rejected term limits for members of Congress, but also precluded the states
or Congress from imposing such restrictions.
69. Jefferson's theory of unenumerated rights under the Tenth Amendment, revealed
in an 1814 letter to his friendjoseph C. Cabell, is consistent with this view. For a discus-
sion of the Standing Qualification Clauses of the Constitution, and attempts by states to
interpose their own requirements on federal representatives, see infra notes 158-242 and
accompanying text.
70. When the Convention met for the first time in May, some delegates protested by
refusing to attend; Rhode Island, which declined to name any delegates, was unrepre-
sented. Robert Yates and John Lansing of New York abandoned the Convention in early
July. Within two months, they were followed by Maryland's Luther Martin, whose "Genu-
ine Information," a tract that purported to reveal the Convention's plot to replace state
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Their well-orchestrated counter-attack included The Federalist Papers, the
first of which appeared the next month, followed by others at regular
intervals thereafter. Each side, then, was very much aware of the other
side's views.
It is significant that several Anti-Federalists publicly condemned the
proposed Constitution for its failure to forbid incumbent members of
Congress from seeking re-election. As discussed below, this response
suggests that even the Constitution's critics believed the document to
reject term limits for federal officeholders. There is no indication,
moreover, that the Anti-Federalists thought that the states ratifying the
Constitution would retain the power to limit the terms of their federal
representatives. On the contrary, the Convention's refusal to enact con-
gressional term limitation helped persuade at least one of its delegates,
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, to denounce the Constitution. 7 1 The
states' ratification of the Constitution shows a realization that, for better
or worse, some members of Congress might be re-elected time and
again.
Admittedly, the more controversial issue of whether to limit the
President's term of office overshadowed the public debate over congres-
sional tenure restrictions. The Convention delegates, stung by Anti-
Federalist charges that they planned to create an "elective king,"
7 2
spent days wrestling with proposals to limit the President to a single
term, eventually rejecting them all. The original Virginia Plan provided
that the President would be "ineligible a second time,"7 3 and the matter
was not resolved until the delegates had discussed it for several months.
Opponents of presidential term limits, such as Governeur Morris of
Pennsylvania, argued that disqualifying an incumbent President from
seeking re-election would destroy his incentive to serve the public inter-
est. Responding to a motion by Luther Martin of Maryland to limit the
President to a single term, Morris warned:
What effect will this have? 1. It will destroy the great incite-
ment to merit public esteem by taking away the hope of being
rewarded with a reappointment. It may give a dangerous turn
to one of the strongest passions in the human breast. The love
of fame is the great spring to noble & illustrious actions. Shut
the Civil road to Glory & he may be compelled to seek it by the
sword. 2. It will tempt him to make the most of the short space
of time allotted him, to accumulate wealth and provide for his
sovereignty with a central monarchy, fanned popular outrage. Finally, by mid-September,
Edmund Randolph and George Mason of Virginia and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts
told the Convention they would not sign the proposed Constitution, outlining objections
that helped frame the public debate over ratification. ANTI-FEDERALISTS VERSUS FEDERAL-
ISTS: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 1-2 (John D. Lewis ed., 1967)[hereinafter ANTI-FEDERALISTS].
71. On September 15, 1787, Gerry told the Convention he would withhold his name
from the Constitution partly because of "the duration and re-eligibility of the Senate." Id.
at 64.
72. William Findley, Letter of an Officer of the Late Continental Army, Nov. 3, 1787, in ANTI-
FEDERALISTS, supra note 70, at 135 (listing arguments against adoption of the
Constitution).
73. NOTES, supra note 66, at 31.
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friends. 3. It will produce violations of the very constitution it
is meant to secure. In moments of pressing danger the tried
abilities and established character of a favorite Magistrate will
prevail over respect for the forms of the Constitution.... Let
him be of short duration, that he may with propriety be re-
eligible.
74
Martin's motion failed, despite the strong backing of Elbridge Gerry and
Edmund Randolph, all three of whom eventually defected to the Anti-
Federalist camp.
7 5
Subsequent proposals to limit the President's tenure also failed.
Martin, Gerry, and Randolph, joined by Virginia's George Mason and
others, continued their rhetorical battle against the "elective king." At
one point in the debate, Gerry was even willing to let the President serve
a single twenty-year term as long as he would be barred from seeking re-
election thereafter. 76 The majority of delegates, meanwhile, thwarted
this and other term limit proposals. Responding to Gerry, Connecti-
cut's Oliver Elseworth insisted that the President "should be re-elected
if his conduct proved him worthy of it. And he will be more likely to
render himself, worthy of it if he be rewardable with it."' 77 James Wilson
of Pennsylvania agreed, adding that Gerry's plan assumed the nation's
most experienced leaders "must be cast aside like a useless hulk"7 8 after
a certain time, even if they had served the country with distinction. Nor
did the debate end when the Convention adjourned. Jefferson himself,
a proponent of the Constitution touted by the Federalists, voiced the
frustrations of many Anti-Federalists when he complained in 1789 that
its "real defect" was "the perpetual re-eligibility of the president."
79
As the high-profile controversy over presidential tenure dragged
on, the Anti-Federalists waged an equally unsuccessful campaign to im-
pose term limits on members of Congress. The Anti-Federalist pam-
phleteer Cincinnatus argued that Senators, like the President, should be
limited to a single term.80 Gerry argued both at the Convention and in
the press that unless congressional terms were limited, nothing could
prevent "the perpetuity of office in the same hands for life." 8' It is strik-
74. Id at 323-24.
75. Id at 322-29.
76. Id at 358. Gerry insisted that a longer term would protect the President from
legislative encroachment while ensuring he would not exploit the office.
77. Ide
78. Id. at 359.
79. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to David Humphreys (March 18, 1789), in ANTI-
FEDERALISTS, supra note 70, at 123-24. Jefferson was in France as U.S. Ambassador when
the Convention was taking place. The "perpetual re-eligibility" of the President finally
came to an end with the ratification of the Twenty-second Amendment to the Constitution
in 1951, limiting the President to two four-year terms.
80. Cincinnatus, Anti-Federalist No.64 On The Organization and Powers of the Senate (Part
III), in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS 188 (Martin Borden ed., 1965). See also Vik D. Amar,
Note, The Senate and the Constitution, 97 YALE LJ. 1111, 1121 (1988) (arguing that the Anti-
Federalists wanted less continuity in the Senate so it would be "merely another represen-
tative body," while the Federalists prevailed in creating "a powerful, deliberative, ener-
getic upper branch").
81. Elbridge Gerry, Replies to the Strictures of 'A Landlord' (1787), in ANTi-FEDERALISTS,
supra note 70, at 199 (footnote omitted). See also Gerry's remarks to the Convention on
1992]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
ing that these and other critics understood the Constitution to exclude
term limits for members of Congress. There is no indication that they
believed the states retained power to impose such restrictions on federal
officeholders. On the contrary, when William Findley urged the citizens
of Philadelphia to reject the proposed Constitution, he lamented: "Ro-
tation, that noble prerogative of liberty, is entirely excluded from the new
system of government and the great men may and probably will be contin-
ued in office during their lives."'8 2 Findley, like others in the Anti-Feder-
alist camp, believed the Constitution was flawed because the republic it
created "entirely excluded" term limitation-not just for the President,
but for members of Congress as well.
2. The Federalist Response.
Not surprisingly, proponents of the Constitution also assumed U.S.
Senators and Representatives would be eligible for re-election under the
new system of government. In The Federalist No. 53, James Madison not
only predicted that some House members would be returned to office
repeatedly, but argued that their re-election would benefit the institu-
tion as a whole:
A few of the members, as happens in all such assemblies, will
possess superior talents, will by frequent re-elections, become
members of long standing; will be thoroughly masters of the
public business, and perhaps not unwilling to avail themselves
of those advantages. The greater the proportion of new mem-
bers, and the less the information of the bulk of the members,
the more apt will they be to fall into the snares that may be laid
for them.
83
Refusing to disqualify incumbents from re-election was consistent with
the Federalists' overarching vision of Congress as a national legislature
that would do more than simply represent state and local interests, as
the Continental Congress had done under the Articles, and whose mem-
bers would engage in a truly deliberative decision-making process. Ear-
lier in The Federalist No. 53, Madison explained that Congress simply
could not function without a cadre of skilled and experienced
lawmakers. Using foreign policy as an example, he argued that main-
taining good relations with other nations meant House members must
September 15, 1787, id at 64 ("Mr. Gerry, stated the objections which determined him to
withhold his name from the Constitution. 1. the duration and re-eligibility of the Sen-
ate."); Elbridge Gerry, Observations by a Columbian Patriot (1788), id. at 181, 184. Earlier in
the Convention, Gerry had read a resolution from the Massachusetts Legislature, in-
structing him "not to depart from the rotation established in the 5th art. of Confederation
..... NOTES, supra note 66, at 451-52. Ironically, Gerry's own tenure in the Continental
Congress had exceeded that of virtually all its other members. See RAKOVE, supra note 64,
at 219.
82. William Findley, Letter of an Officer of the Late Continental Army, Nov. 3, 1787, ANTI-
FEDERALISTS, supra note 70, at 135 (emphasis added). See also Samuel Bryan, Letters of Cen-
tinel, I, Oct. 5, 1787, id. at 139, 141 (urging Philadelphians to reject the Constitution be-
cause it excluded rotation for federal officials).
83. THE FEDERALIST No. 53, at 365 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961).
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have a working knowledge of all applicable treaties, domestic commer-
cial policy, and the laws of the affected countries. Madison observed:
Some portion of this knowledge may no doubt be acquired in a
man's closet, but some of it can only be derived from the public
sources of information; and all of it will be acquired to best
effect by a practical attention to the subject during the period
of actual service in the legislature.
8 4
Madison was never one to confuse men with angels, and the fram-
ers' preoccupation with governmental checks and balances-seen most
dramatically in the tripartite separation of federal powers-dispels any
doubt that they were in fact realists when it came to controlling human
beings and their sometimes evil ambitions. Yet, while recognizing the
possible dangers of congressional incumbency, the Federalists decided
that the benefits, in the form of greater institutional stability and exper-
tise, outweighed the risks. The corrupt tendencies of individual incum-
bents could be controlled by requiring all federal legislators to face their
electors with reasonable frequency. While The Federalist Papers ignore
the Anti-Federalists' demand for congressional term limitation, they
devote considerable attention to the need for frequent congressional
elections, which Madison called the "corner stone" of liberty.8 5
The Convention debate over two- and six-year terms for Represent-
atives and Senators, respectively, was reminiscent of that which had
taken place in England a few years earlier over limiting the duration of
parliamentary terms.8 6 Indeed, in rejecting the Anti-Federalists' claim
that "where annual elections end, tyranny begins," Madison contrasted
the Constitution's biennial elections for Representatives with the seven-
year sessions of the British House of Commons:
As it is essential to liberty that the government in general,
should have a common interest with the people; so it is particu-
larly essential that . . . [the House of Representatives] should
have an immediate dependence on, & an intimate sympathy
with the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy
by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured. But
what particular degree of frequency may be absolutely neces-
sary for the purpose, does not appear to be susceptible of any
precise calculation .... [I]f we may argue from the degree of
liberty retained even under septennial elections, and all the
other vicious ingredients in the [British] parliamentary consti-
tution we cannot doubt ... that biennial elections under the
federal system cannot possibly be dangerous to the requisite
dependence of the house of representatives on their
constituents.
8 7
84. Id. at 364.
85. Id. at 361.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 57-61.
87. THE FEDERALST No. 52, at 355-57 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961)(emphasis added). At the time of the framing, the frequency of elections for the
popular branch of the legislature varied from state to state. Connecticut and Rhode Island
held more than one election per year, while South Carolina held biennial elections. Id. at
360.
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Just as the Federalists' refusal to restrict congressional incumbency
was consistent with republican values, their insistence on biennial rather
than annual elections for Representatives, and on even longer terms for
Senators, was intended to promote a deliberative national legislature.
The founders were determined not to repeat the mistakes of the parlia-
mentary system, which had permitted abuses of power that subverted
the English constitution. But given the failure of the Articles of Confed-
eration, they were also committed to creating a Congress that would be
truly national in scope, and stable enough to withstand constant pres-
sure from special-interest groups as well as the popular passions of the
moment. Madison articulated this view in perhaps the best-known Fed-
eralist essay, The Federalist No. 10, when he rejected a "pure democracy"
in favor of a republic that would
refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through
the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may
best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patri-
otism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to
temporary or partial considerations."8
Accordingly, The Federalist No. 53 concludes that two-year terms for
Representatives, coupled with the accrued experience of veteran
lawmakers, would provide the institutional experience and expertise de-
manded of a national legislature. The Anti-Federalists' call for term lim-
itation, and for annual elections, would have more closely resembled
pure democracy, but it simply could not sustain the degree of institu-
tional competence demanded of a republican Congress. Although an-
nual elections were then the practice in the popular branches of most
state legislatures, that alone could not warrant their use at the federal
level. Madison recognized that "the business of federal legislation must
continue so far to exceed both in novelty and difficulty, the legislative
business of a single state as to justify the longer period of service as-
signed to those who are to transact it."8 9
Biennial elections for Representatives, moreover, were offset by the
six-year terms for Senators, who were to be elected directly by the state
88. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 62 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). The
very essence of Madisonian republicanism is that the electors choose representatives not
merely to protect their parochial interests, but to join with other representatives in a col-
lective deliberation for the common good. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 61-64, 179-80 (1969). As Professor Wills observes
about the passage quoted above:
The image is of "refining," in which a substance is passed through several
processes-Hume's successive "concoctions"-to reach a pure state. For
Madison, the thing to be refined is virtue. It is present in the people, who are
admitted to the first concoction; otherwise their genius would not be republican.
But it is in an impure state there, mingled with private interest and local bias.
Through several concoctions, the interest is purged.
GARY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 226 (1981). See alsoJames E. Castello,
Note, The Limits of Popular Sovereignty: Using the Initiative Power to Control Legislative Procedure,
74 CALIF. L. REV. 491, 537-39 (1986)(discussing Professor Wills's proposition). A variant
of this view holds the Federalists achieved "a kind of synthesis of republicanism and the
emerging principles of pluralism." Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Life,
38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 47 (1985).
89. THE FEDERALIST No. 53, at 364 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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legislatures. The framers believed the Senate was especially important
to the balance of legislative powers because it would ensure stability and
expertise; a relatively small group of Senators, each serving for six-year
terms, would guard against "the impulse of sudden violent passions" to
which Representatives might succumb. 90 Madison envisioned a "cool
and deliberate" Senate, with "sufficient permanency to provide for such
objects as require a continued attention.... [S]uch an institution may be
sometimes necessary, as a defence to the people against their own tem-
porary errors and delusions." 9 1
Not only do The Federalist Papers omit any discussion of the proposals
by Elbridge Gerry and other critics to limit Senators to one term, but
Madison warned that the "rapid succession of new [House] members,
however qualified they may be, points out in the strongest manner, the
necessity of some stable institution in the government." 92 If anything,
the Federalists feared that high rates of congressional turnover might
undermine the effectiveness of the national legislature. This may seem
strange to us today, but at the time of the framing, relatively few
lawmakers aspired to serve for several consecutive terms. In the popular
branches of the state legislatures, for example, turnover averaged 50%
per election.93 In The Federalist No. 63, Madison noted:
from this change of men must proceed a change of opinions;
and from a change of opinions, a change of measures. But a
continual change even of good measures is inconsistent with
every rule of prudence, and every prospect of success. The re-
mark is verified in private life, and becomes more just as well as
more important, in national transactions.
94
Prudence, then, was inconsistent with term limits that would bar veter-
ans from seeking re-election.
As the Convention drew to a close, the Anti-Federalists' campaign
for term limitation foundered. Randolph's Virginia Plan expressly lim-
ited Representatives to a single term, but the delegates voted to elimi-
nate this provision on June 12th.9 5 Gerry and others demanded term
limits for Senators, but they too were unsuccessful.
9 6
Later Convention debates further support the argument that both
Federalists and Anti-Federalists understood the final draft of the Consti-
tution to exclude term limits for members of Congress. On July 26th,
for example, the delegates were at loggerheads over whether to limit the
President to a single term. George Mason offered one of many motions
to declare the President ineligible to seek re-election. According to
Madison, Mason
held it as an essential point, as the very palladium of Civil lib-
90. THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 418 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
91. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 424-25 (James Madison)(icob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
92. THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 420 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
96. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
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erty, that the great officers of the State, and particularly the Ex-
ecutive should at fixed periods return to that mass from which
they were at first taken, in order that they may feel & respect
those rights & interests, which are again to be personally valua-
ble to them.
9 7
Governeur Morris opposed Mason's motion by arguing that "on the
same principle the Judiciary ought to be periodically degraded; certain it
was that the Legislature ought on every principle, yet no one had proposed
or conceived that the members of it should not be re-eligible."
'9 8
For better or worse, term limits had been abandoned. The framers
instead chose to harness the self-interested motives of incumbent legis-
lators to the advantage of their new republic through the mechanism of
frequent elections. Madison made this point in The Federalist No. 57 by
observing that:
these ties which bind the representative to his constituents are
strengthened by motives of a more selfish nature. His pride
and vanity attach him to a form of government which favors his
pretensions, and gives him a share of its honors and distinc-
tions. Whatever hopes or projects might be entertained by a
few aspiring characters, it must generally happen that a great
proportion of the men deriving their advancement from their
influence with the people, would have more to hope from a
preservation of their favor, than from innovations in the gov-
ernment subversive of the authority of the people.
All these securities, however, would be found very insuffi-
cient without the restraint of frequent elections. Hence... the
House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the
members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the
people. Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the
mode of their elevation can be effaced by the exercise of power,
they will be compelled to anticipate the moment when their
power is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be reviewed,
and when they must descend to the level from which they were
raised; there forever to remain unless a faithful discharge of
their trust shall have established their title to a renewal of it.9 9
Madison was writing about the House, but his willingness to let the elec-
tors decide who should represent them in Congress-without restricting
their choice through a constitutional provision rendering incumbents in-
eligible for re-election-applies with equal force to the Senate. 10 0
Looking back at the framing from today's vantage point, the Feder-
alists may well have overestimated the ability of frequent elections to
control Congress. Madison and Mason lived in an era in which relatively
97. NoTEs, supra note 66, at 371.
98. Id. at 371-72 (emphasis added).
99. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 386 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
100. As discussed supra note 63, Senators were then chosen by the state legislatures.
The point, however, is that nothing in the original Article I, Section 3 (or, for that matter,
the Seventeenth Amendment, which provides for the popular election of Senators) pur-
ports to restrict incumbent Senators, who presumably have the same "selfish" motives as
Representatives, from seeking re-election.
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few men aspired to serve for many years in the upper echelons of the
federal government. Madison and like-minded Convention delegates
expected only a few House members "with superior talents"' 0 1 to be re-
elected every two years-a far cry from today's re-election rate of
greater than 90%.
102
Nonetheless, from the founders' perspective the matter was set-
tled.10 3 Thus, to pretend that the framers failed to speak at all is to deny
the thoroughness and decisiveness of the term limit debate. Maintain-
ing respect for their original understanding of the Constitution means
that nothing short of a constitutional amendment can impose term limits
on members of Congress.
3. The Bill of Rights.
After failing to enact congressional term limits in the text of the
original Constitution, Anti-Federalists tried to include such restrictions
in the Bill of Rights. When the first Congress convened in 1789, Repre-
sentative Thomas Tucker of South Carolina introduced term limitation
proposals for both the House and Senate.' 0 4 Tucker's first proposal
would have limited Representatives to a maximum of three terms during
an eight-year period. His second bill would have reduced a Senator's
term to one year while restricting him to five consecutive years of service
during a six-year period.' 0 5 Unfortunately for the Anti-Federalists, the
House never voted on either of Tucker's measures.106
Anti-Federalists favoring congressional term limitation made better
inroads at the state ratifying conventions. For instance, a term limit pro-
posal for both the executive and legislative branches was among the
amendments to the U.S. Constitution discussed at the Virginia Ratifying
Convention in 1788.107 That same year, the North Carolina Ratifying
Convention urged Congress to adopt a "Declaration of Rights" endors-
ing the principle of rotation in executive and legislative office. 10 8 Dele-
101. THE FEDERALiST No. 53, at 365 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
102. Hertzberg, supra note 10 and accompanying text.
103. Of course, it might be argued that the framers' original intentions are no longer
binding, that they should be totally disregarded, and that changed circumstances in mod-
em American society justify reading term limits into the text of the Constitution. We re-
ject this approach. As Judge Frank Easterbrook wrote in a recent essay commemorating
the bicentennial of the Constitution: "The Constitution is a system of laws, not an empty
vessel into which we can pour our dreams. That is how it was, is and must always be."
Frank H. Easterbrook, An Immutable Vision, WASH. POST MAG., June 28, 1987, at 52.
104. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 790 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
105. Id.
106. Richardson, supra note 5, at 4.
107. Interestingly, the committee charged with proposing constitutional amendments
at the Virginia Ratifying Convention formally proposed a term limit amendment for the
President, but not for members of Congress. The proposed Thirteenth Amendment to
the Constitution was to provide: "That no person shall be capable of being President of
the United States for more than eight years in any term of sixteen years." Virginia Ratifying
Convention, Proposed Amendments to the Constitution, June 17, 1788, in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CON-
sTrruTiON, supra note 41, at 17. However, the committee recommended that in enumerat-
ing "the essential and unalienable rights of the people," the Bill of Rights should include
the concept of both presidential and congressional term limitation. Id- at 15.
108. North Carolina Ratifying Convention, Declaration of Rights and Other Amendments, August
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gates at the New York Ratifying Convention of 1788 took a slightly
different approach, proposing "[t]hat no person be eligible as a senator
for more than six years in any term of twelve years."' 0 9
Yet these Anti-Federalist victories were short-lived. Despite the
term limitation proposals that emerged from the state ratifying conven-
tions, the Bill of Rights introduced by Representative James Madison at
the first Congress in 1789 did not include either presidential or congres-
sional term limits. "0 Later that same year, Congress submitted twelve
proposed articles of amendment to the states. None of these proposed
articles included term limits for federal officials." ' Just as the Anti-Fed-
eralists failed to muster enough support to place their term limit pro-
posals in the text of the original Constitution, so too did they fail in
1791.112
II. THE STANDING QUALIFICATIONS FOR CONGRESSIONAL SERVICE
While the Convention delegates rejected congressional term limits,
it might still be argued that the Constitution does not explicitly prevent
states from imposing such restrictions. Thus, the argument goes, the
passage of the Bill of Rights in 1791 should be seen as a belated victory
for the Anti-Federalists. The Tenth Amendment could be read to bol-
ster this argument by providing that "[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the People."' 13 Since the Con-
stitution does not expressly prohibit states from limiting congressional
terms, a negative inference might be drawn that the states retain this
power through the Tenth Amendment. 1
4
1, 1788, in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONsTIrTiON, supra note 4 1, at 17. North Carolina proposed
that Congress adopt a "Declaration of Rights" that included as its fifth principle:
That the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers of government should be
separate and distinct, and that the members of the two first may be restrained
from oppression by feeling and participating in the public burdens: they should,
at fixed periods, be reduced to a private station, return into the mass of people,
and the vacancies be supplied by certain and regular elections, in which all or any
part of the former members to be eligible or ineligible, as the rules of the consti-
tution of government and the laws shall direct.
Id.
109. New York Ratification of Constitution, July 26, 1788, in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTrru-
TION, supra note 41, at 14. New York delegates also proposed limiting the President to two
terms. Id.
I10. See House of Representatives, Amendments to the Constitution, June 8, 1789, in 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CoNsTrrrunON, supra note 41, at 25-29.
111. See H.R. Doc. No. 256, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1977). Of the original twelve,
articles II through XII were ratified in 1791 and are popularly known as the Bill of Rights.
112. One historian has concluded that for nearly 150 years after Representative Tucker
introduced his ill-fated term limit proposals in 1789, "limiting congressional service by
constitutional amendment did not appear to be much of an issue, and no such measure
came to a vote in Congress." Richardson, supra note 5, at 4.
113. U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
114. The Ninth Amendment, which provides that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitu-
tion of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people," might be seen as another textual basis for this theory. Supporters of the 1990
Colorado term limitation campaign invoked both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments in
response to suggestions that their initiative might be unconstitutional. For example, in the
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Despite the appeal of this argument to modern reformers, the archi-
tects of the Constitution plainly intended the opposite result. From the
outset of the Convention, Madison and his allies were determined that
the Standing Qualifications Clauses contained in Article I, Sections 2
and 3115 would be the exclusive list of qualifications for congressional ser-
vice. Imposing term limitation without a constitutional amendment
would add an unenumerated qualification-lack of incumbency-to
membership requirements that are fixed by the Constitution. It would
also contravene a constitutional safeguard that the framers saw as criti-
cal to popular sovereignty: that all persons who can satisfy the Standing
Qualifications Clauses are eligible to serve in the U.S. Congress.'
1 6
A. Restrictions on the Electors, Not the Elected
The founders' decision to make the Standing Qualifications Clauses
the sole criteria for congressional membership is especially striking
given their insistence that states be allowed to set their own restrictions
on who could vote in federal elections. Article I, Section 2 provides
that "the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite of
the most numerous branch of the State Legislature."'1 17 The states have
frequently used this power to disqualify women, blacks and others from
voting while enforcing minimum property ownership requirements rem-
iniscent of those in England. 1 18 In contrast, the Constitution says noth-
ing about letting states impose similar qualifications on federal
officeholders. This silence was the product of one of the founding's
greatest debates: whether to restrict service in the national legislature
to an elite few. The majority of delegates chose to reject an array of
proposed membership qualifications-mostly pertaining to wealth-
before approving the relatively minimal standing qualifications of age,
residency and citizenship that are found in Article I. 19
article written by Mike Kelly, campaign chairman Considine is described as believing that
"the ninth and tenth Amendments make it plain that what he [Considine] is trying to do is
constitutional." Kelly, supra note 8, at 7. After reciting the text of the two amendments,
Kelly writes:
What this means, Considine says, is that the federal government has only
those powers explicitly delegated to it by the Constitution, and the implied pow-
ers needed to carry out the powers explicitly delegated. On any matter on which
the Constitution is silent, the states have the right to do what they want. There is
no mention in the Constitution, pro or con, on [sic] limiting the tenure of con-
gressmen and senators. So if the states want to limit federal terms, they can do
SO.
ME (citation omitted).
115. U.S. CONsT. art. I, §§ 2 and 3. See supra note 25 for a discussion of the contents of
these provisions.
116. Since the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, Senators have been
directly elected by the voters, as House members have always been. See supra note 63.
Thus, while the founders understandably limited their discussion of popular sovereignty
to the House, which was to be the "popular branch" of the legislature, their remarks now
apply with equal force to the Senate.
117. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
119. This is obviously not to suggest that the framers envisioned a truly representative
Congress that would include, for instance, minorities and women, or the economically
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1. Populist Politics.
In response to mounting pressure from populist politicians and
commentators, the founders wanted to give at least the appearance of hav-
ing created a national legislature that was truly representative. Standing
qualifications for federal lawmakers that were both inclusive (ensuring
that the "common man" as well as the aristocrat could serve in Con-
gress) andfixed (thereby insulated from tampering by Congress and the
states) would help ease concerns that the proposed Congress might be-
come the American equivalent of Parliament. However, by retaining
state-imposed restrictions on electors, the Constitution would at the
same time guard against the emergence of an overly popular legislature
that might threaten private property and other vested interests.
The Convention debate over property qualifications reveals the
framers' balancing act. One of the most hotly contested of all constitu-
tional debates, both in Philadelphia and at the state ratifying conven-
tions, focused on whether federal officeholders should be required to
own a specified amount of property. At one extreme, South Carolina's
Charles Pinckney urged his fellow Convention delegates to adopt prop-
erty qualifications for officials in all three branches of government.1
20
Madison, on the other hand, was convinced that "qualifications in the
Electors would be much more effectual than in the elected."' 12 1 The ma-
jority of delegates-including dissidents such as Virginia's George Ma-
son-agreed, rejecting every attempt to impose property qualifications
on federal officeholders.
122
Many delegates who favored property and other qualifications were
willing to forego them in the interest of political necessity. The Conven-
tion had been stung by criticism from the Anti-Federalists who warned
that service in the new Congress would be limited to the rich and power-
ful, just as the House of Commons had in practice been dominated by
the landed aristocracy. Richard Henry Lee, for instance, told fellow Vir-
ginian Edmund Randolph that the House of Representatives would pro-
vide only the illusion of democracy, amounting to little more than "a
disadvantaged, in equal proportion to their numbers in the population. Even the most
ardent Anti-Federalists, who chided the Federalists for failing to create a national legisla-
ture that would truly "mirror" the populace, were not advocates of social equality in any
modem sense. Indeed, there was virtually unanimous agreement on both sides that the
states should be free to set qualifications for federal electors, which meant that in practice
a great many Americans would be excluded from voting.
120. See Pinckney's remarks in Farrand, supra note 67. But even Pinckney opposed dis-
qualifying public debtors from serving in Congress, fearing it would unfairly exclude "per-
sons who had purchased confiscated property or should purchase Western territory of the
public." A proposal to this effect was defeated by a vote of 7 to 2. See Pinckney's remarks
ofJuly 26, 1789, in THE FOUNDERS' CONsTrruTION, supra note 41, at 71.
121. Id. at 70.
122. Id. See also Mason's remarks of the same day, id. at 69 (observing that the parlia-
mentary qualifications adopted by England in 1710 had met with "universal approba-
tion"). Governeur Morris also spoke in favor of Madison's view. See Morris's remarks, id[
at 69-70. Although the Constitution spells out qualifications for both the President and
members of Congress, it is virtually silent as to judicial qualifications. For possible expla-
nations, seeJohn R. Vile and Mario Perez-Reilly, The U.S. Constitution and Judicial Qualifica-
tions: A Curious Omission, JUDICATURE 198 (Dec./Jan. 1991).
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mere shred or rag of representation."1 23 Similarly, the minority at the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention argued that the proposed Constitu-
tion would ensure that
men of the most elevated rank in life will alone be chosen [to
serve in Congress]. The other orders in society, such as farm-
ers, traders, and mechanics, who all ought to have a competent
number of their best informed men in the legislature, shall be
totally unrepresented .... [Congress] will consist of the lordly
and high minded; of men who will have no congenial feelings
with the people, but a perfect indifference for, and contempt of
them; [it] will consist of those harpies of power that prey upon
the very vitals, that riot on the miseries of the community.124
The Federalists thus faced the delicate task of diffusing these popu-
list charges without alienating others who feared popular sovereignty
would jeopardize their property interests. Madison devoted all of The
Federalist No. 57 to rebutting charges that the House "will be taken from
that class of citizens which will have least sympathy with the mass of the
people, and be most likely to aim at an ambitious sacrifice of the many to
the aggrandizement of the few." 125 In response to Anti-Federalist con-
cerns that congressional control over elections would usurp the states'
power, he stressed that federal electors "are to be the same who exercise
the right in every State of electing the correspondent branch of the Leg-
islature of the State."' 2 6 In practice, "[t]he electors are to be the great
body of the people of the United States"' 2 7-a sharp contrast to Eng-
land, where 90%o of the population was disenfranchised. As for congres-
sional eligibility, Madison wrote:
Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen
whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and confidence
of his country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious
faith, or of civil profession, is permitted to fetter the judgment
or disappoint the inclination of the people.
128
In other words, the minimal requirements of age, residency and citizen-
ship were to be the sole criteria for congressional service. As Alexander
Hamilton noted in The Federalist No. 60, Congress's membership qualifi-
cations "are defined and fixed in the constitution; they are unalterable
by the legislature."'
29
The debate over property qualifications underscores the founders'
commitment to limiting the scope of standing qualifications for congres-
sional service, so as to create the popular perception (if not reality) that
the national legislature could accommodate members with a wide range
123. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Edmund Randolph (Oct. 16, 1787), in ANTI-
FEDERALISTS, supra note 70, at 19.
124. The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of Penn-
sylvania to Their Constituents, PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1787-1788, at
472 (John B. McMaster & F. D. Stone eds., 1888).
125. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 384 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
126. Id. at 385.
127. Id. By today's standards, of course, this was something of an overstatement.
128. Id. at 384.
129. THE FEDERALIST No. 60, at 409 (Alexander Hamilton)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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of interests and experience. Additional qualifications, such as property
ownership requirements, would have enflamed populist fears that the
Convention delegates had schemed to build an American aristocracy.1
3 0
By characterizing these qualifications as inclusive and immune from
state or congressional interference, the Federalists were able to take a
strong public stand in favor of representative democracy, while at the
same time assuring critics that the states would continue setting qualifi-
cations for federal electors. Madison alludes to this political compro-
mise in The Federalist No. 52:
The first view to be taken of... [the House of Representatives]
relates to the qualifications of the electors and the elected.
Those of the former are to be the same with those of the elec-
tors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislatures.
The definition of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded as
a fundamental article of republican government. It was incum-
bent on the Convention therefore to define and establish this
right, in the Constitution. To have left it open for the occa-
sional regulation of the Congress, would have been improper
for the reason-just mentioned. To have submitted it to the leg-
islative discretion of the States, would have been improper for
the same reason; and for the additional reason, that it would
have rendered too dependent on the State Governments, that
branch of the Federal Government, which ought to be depen-
dent on the people alone. To have reduced the diferent qualifica-
tions in the different States, to one uniform rule, would probably have
been as dissatisfactory to some of the States, as it would have been difficult
to the Convention. The provision made by the Convention appears there-
fore, to be the best that lay within their option. It must be satisfactory
130. Moreover, such qualifications would have narrowed the class of persons eligible to
serve in Congress, possibly at the expense of republican values. In The Federalist No. 10,
Madison warns against "faction"-the dangers of special-interest groups that might domi-
nate the legislature at the expense of the national interest. Madison believed faction could
be controlled not only by promoting a deliberative and experienced legislature that could
"refine and enlarge the public views," but by ensuring that Congress would have enough
members to represent a multitude of interests, diminishing the clout of any single faction.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 62 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Madison
cautioned:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and inter-
ests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently
will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individ-
uals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are
placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression.
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you
make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to
invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be
more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in uni-
son with each other.
Id. at 62-63.
Admittedly, the founders tended to be wary of popular sovereignty. Consequently,
their failure to impose property qualifications on federal officeholders hardly means that
they embraced the populist notion that Congress should consist of people from all profes-
sions and walks of life. Rather, Hamilton observed that "there would be no temptation to
violate the constitution in favor of the landed class, because that class would in the natural
course of things enjoy as great a preponderancy as itself could desire." THE FEDERALIST
No. 60, at 407 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)(rejecting charges that the
landed aristocracy would monopolize Congress).
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to every State; because it is conformable to the standard al-
ready established, or which may be established by the State
itself...
The qualifications of the elected being less carefully and properly defined
by the State Constitutions, and being at the same time more susceptible of
uniformity, have been very properly considered and regulated by the Con-
vention. A representative of the United States must be of the
age of twenty-five years; must have been seven years a citizen of
the United States, must at the time of his election, be an in-
habitant of the State he is to represent, and during the time of
his service must be in no office under the United States. Under
these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the Federal Govern-
ment, is open to merit of every description, whether native or adop-
tive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or
wealth, or to any particular profession of religious faith.
13 1
The founders' determination to restrict the standing qualifications
to those enumerated in Article I was therefore part of a much larger
compromise over the role of popular democracy in the federal scheme.
Fixed, inclusive qualifications would help reassure a nervous public that
service in the national legislature would not be limited to a privileged
few. This, in turn, might substantially improve the Constitution's
chances for success at the state ratifying conventions.
Against this political backdrop, it is hardly surprising that the dele-
gates at Philadelphia repeatedly voted down a host of proposed restric-
tions on congressional membership, while insisting that the few finally
agreed upon could be altered only by constitutional amendment. When
the Convention ended, the views of delegates such as New Hampshire's
John Langdon had carried the day. Langdon warned that too many re-
strictions on congressional service "would render the system unaccept-
able to the people."1 3 2 Alexander Hamilton echoed this sentiment when
he admonished delegates eager to exclude foreign immigrants from
membership in Congress that such "minute restrictions" would be "em-
barrassing" to the government.' 3 3 Admittedly, the consensus was not
universal. A few delegates, such as Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts
and John Dickenson of Delaware, proposed letting Congress determine
its own membership qualifications. 13 4 But in the face of strong Federal-
ist pressure, these proposals went nowhere.
131. THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 354-55 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961)(emphasis added).
132. THE FOUNDERS' CONSTrrtnION, supra note 41, at 71. Governeur Morris's remarks
of the same day support Langdon's position: "It was a precept of great antiquity as well as
of high authority ... we should not be righteous overmuch. He thought we ought to be
equally on our guard agst. being wise over much .... how cruel wd. it be ... to keep a
distinguished & meritorious Citizen under a temporary disability & disenfranchisement."
Ia at 69-70.
133. L at 72. Governeur Morris, like Hamilton, "was opposed to such minutious reg-
ulations in a Constitution." Ia at 70.
134. Id. at 69, 70. Dickenson opposed listing any qualifications for congressional ser-
vice in the Constitution for fear that it would "by implication tie up the hands of the Legis-
lature from supplying the omissions .. " Id. at 70.
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2. The John Wilkes Case.
There is a second reason why the founders decided against giving
Congress or the states a free hand to create their own qualifications for
federal officeholders. Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike were well
aware of the John Wilkes case, described by the Supreme Court as "the
most notorious English election dispute of the 18th century."
13 5
The controversy began in 1763, when Wilkes, a House member,
published a blistering attack on the Crown for concluding a peace treaty
with France.' 3 6 His subsequent arrest, conducted by Royal authorities
using an illegal warrant and in violation of parliamentary privilege,
quickly made him a popular hero.' 3 7 Prior to trial, Wilkes went before
the House to denounce his treatment as unconstitutional, promising
that if his colleagues would affirm his right to be privileged from arrest,
"I shall then be not only ready, but eagerly desirous, to wave that privi-
lege, and to put myself upon ajury of my countrymen."'13 8 Instead, the
House expelled him for publishing seditious libel. 13 9 Wilkes then fled
England-ironically, to France, where English authorities later sen-
tenced him to remain in exile.140 The following year, after the Parlia-
135. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 527 (1969).
136. lId
137. See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at 99-100. In a speech to the House of Commons
on November 15, 1763, Wilkes recounted the details of his arrest, which would later serve
as a potent example to the American Colonists of the extent to which Parliament and the
Crown had subverted the constitution:
On the 30th of April, in the morning, I was made a prisoner in my own house, by
some of the king's messengers. I demanded by what authority they had forced
their way into my room, and was shewn a warrant in which no person was named
in particular, but generally the authors, printers and publishers of a seditious and
treasonable paper, intitled, The North Briton, No. 45. The messengers insisted on
my going before lord Halifax, which I absolutely refused, because the warrant
was, I thought, illegal and did not respect me. I applied, by my friends, to the
court of common pleas, for a Habeas Corpus, which was granted, but as the
proper office was not then open, it could not immediately issue. I was afterwards
carried, by violence, before the earls of Egremont and Halifax, whom I informed
of the orders given by the court of common pleas for the Habeas Corpus; and I
enlarged upon this subject to Mr. Webb, the solicitor of the treasury. I was, how-
ever, hurried away to the Tower by another warrant, which declared me the au-
thor and publisher of a most infamous and seditious libel, intitled, The North
Briton, No. 45. The word treasonable was dropped, yet I was detained a close
prisoner, and no person was suffered to come near me for almost three days,
although my council, and several of my friends, demanded admittance, in order
to concert the means of recovering my liberty. My house was plundered, my bu-
reaus broke open, by order of two of your members, Mr. Wood and Mr. Webb,
and all my papers carried away. After six days imprisonment I was discharged, by
the unanimous judgment of the court of common pleas, "That the privilege of my
house extended to my case." Notwithstanding this solemn decision of one of the
king's superior courts of justice, a few days after, I was served with a subpoena
upon an information exhibited against me in the king's bench. I lost no time in
consulting the best books, as well as the greatest living authorities; and from the
truest judgment I could form, I thought that serving me with a subpoena was
another violation of the privilege of parliament, which I will neither desert nor
betray, and therefore I have not yet entered an appearance.
JOHN WILKES, A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF THE GENUINE PAPERS, LETERS, &C. IN THE CASE
OF JOHN WILKES, EsQ. 51-3 (1767).
138. Id. at 54.




ment from which he had been expelled was dissolved, Wilkes returned
to England and was re-elected. 14 1 Before he could serve, however, he
was tried and convicted of seditious libel and sentenced to twenty-two
months' imprisonment.1 4 2 During his imprisonment, the new Parlia-
ment declared Wilkes ineligible for membership and expelled him from
the House of Commons.143
Wilkes was released from prison in 1770, campaigned for re-elec-
tion, and won, but once again, the Parliament declared him ineligible
and declined to seat him. 144 In all, Wilkes was re-elected three times to
the vacant seat; but Parliament was unbending, and each time he was
declared ineligible to serve.'
45
Wilkes's release from prison triggered a fierce debate over Parlia-
ment's ability to exclude duly elected members for reasons other than
those fixed in the British constitution. Prior to Wilkes's arrest, English
precedent stood for the proposition that" 'the law of the land had regu-
lated the qualifications of members to serve in parliament' and those
qualifications were 'not occasional but fixed.' ",146 The first edition of
Blackstone's Commentaries,147 published in 1765, is also consistent with
this view. 14 8 The House later returned to this position in 1782 by ex-
punging from Wilkes's record the resolutions disqualifying him from
141. IL
142. Ik-
143. Id at 527-28.
144. Id at 528.
145. Id.
146. Id., quoting 16 PARL. HIsT. ENG. 589, 590 (1769). But see HOLDSWORTH, supra note
37, at 540 (arguing that the question of whether the House of Commons could exclude
members for reasons other than those enumerated in the constitution "was by no means
an easy question to answer ... [b]oth those who asserted and those who denied the au-
thority of the House were able to cite authority for their views"). As evidence of this
confusion, Holdsworth cites Blackstone, who oscillated on the matter. Id However, Black-
stone's views may have been colored by the Wilkes controversy itself. See infra note 148.
147. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES (1765).
148. In Professor Holdsworth's words, Blackstone "had not stated that a vote of the
House could render a candidate incapable of being elected; and, after enumerating various
incapacities, he had said that, subject to them, 'every subject of the realm is eligible [to
serve in Parliament] of common right.'" HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at 540. Thus, when
Blackstone took the position during the Wilkes affair that Parliament could, by resolution,
disqualify a member from sitting for the remainder of that Parliament without relying on
the standing qualifications fixed by the constitution, his opponents naturally cited the Com-
mentaries against him. Id.
In the wake of this criticism, Blackstone revised the later editions of the Commentaries
to conform with what had happened to Wilkes, explaining that "there are instances,
wherein persons in particular circumstances have forfeited that common right, and have
been declared ineligiblefor that Parliament ... orfor ever by an Act of the Legislature." Id.
at 541 (quoting Blackstone's Commentaries) (emphasis in original).
In Powell v. McCormack, the Supreme Court cites Holdsworth's analysis of Black-
stone's Commentaries to support its assertion that Blackstone "was an apologist for the anti-
Wilkes forces in Parliament." 395 U.S. 486, 537-38 (1969). While this may or may not
have been true as a matter of history, it is inaccurate to attribute this view to Holdsworth.
In fact, Holdsworth's History stresses that there were plausible arguments on both sides.
See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at 540.
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serving in Parliament, 14 9 resolving that its prior actions were "subver-
sive of the rights of the whole body of electors of this kingdom." 15 0
Wilkes's struggle to be seated in Parliament made him a cause celebre
for the Colonists, and "the cry of 'Wilkes and Liberty' echoed loudly
across the Atlantic Ocean as wide publicity was given to every step of
Wilkes' public career in the colonial press... -151 Consequently, when
the Convention delegates met at Philadelphia five years later, they were
very much aware of how Parliament had manipulated the standing quali-
fications to exclude Wilkes. They vowed not to make the same mistake.
On August 10, 1787, as the debate over property qualifications for
federal officeholders continued, the Convention considered a proposal
by the Committee on Detail that "[t]he Legislature of the United States
shall have authority to establish such uniform qualifications of the mem-
bers of each House, with regard to property, as to the said Legislature
shall seem expedient." 152 In language which the Supreme Court later
described as strikingly similar to that of Wilkes, 15 3 Madison urged dele-
gates to accept nothing less than standing qualifications fixed by the
Constitution. The Committee's proposal, Madison warned, would
vest[] an improper & dangerous power in the Legislature. The
qualifications of electors and elected were fundamental articles
in a Republican Govt. and ought to be fixed by the Constitu-
tion .... A Republic may be converted into an aristocracy or
oligarchy as well by limiting the number capable of being
elected, as the number authorized to elect. 15 4
As the deliberations continued, Madison referred to what constitutional
historian Charles Warren later concluded "was undoubtedly.., the fa-
mous election case of John Wilkes."' 15 5 Madison denounced Parlia-
149. Powell, 395 U.S. at 528.
150. Id. (quoting 22 PARL. HIST. ENG. 1411 (1782)).
151. LAWRENCE GIPSON, I I THE BRITISH EMPIRE BEFORE THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
222 (1956). Gipson continues: "The reaction in America took on significant proportions.
Colonials tended to identify their cause with that of Wilkes. They saw him as a popular
hero and a martyr to the struggle for liberty.... They named towns, counties, and even
children in his honour." Id.
152. Farrand, supra note 67, at 179.
153. Powell, 395 U.S. at 534. After reviewing both the Wilkes affair and the debates
over standing qualifications at the Convention, the Court in Powell concluded that the
House could not exclude Representative Adam Clayton Powell, who had been duly re-
elected by the voters, from taking his seat for any reason other than those enumerated in
the Standing Qualifications Clause of Article I, Section 2. The Court then cited this pas-
sage from the Wilkes debate in Parliament:
'That the right of the electors to be represented by men of their own choice, was
so essential for the preservation of all their other rights, that it ought to be con-
sidered as one of the most sacred parts of our constitution.... That the law of
the land had regulated the qualifications of members to serve in parliament, and
that the freeholders ... had an indisputable right to return whom they thought
proper, provided he was not disqualified by any of those known laws .... They
are not occasional but fixed: to rule and govern the question as it shall arise; not
to start up on a sudden, and shift from side to side, as the caprice of the day or
the fluctuation of the party shall direct.'
Id. (citing 16 PARL. HIST. ENG. 589-90 (1769)).
154. Farrand, supra note 67, at 249-50.
155. CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONsTrruTION 420 n.1 (1929).
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ment's self-proclaimed power to decide the qualifications of both
electors and the elected: "the abuse they had made of it was a lesson
worthy of our attention."1 5 6 Madison's fellow delegates agreed, and the
Committee's proposal was not enacted.
Madison leveled his criticism at Parliament, the institution that had
defied the law of the land by asserting the right to exclude Wilkes with-
out any priorjustification. Yet the founders' insistence that the standing
qualifications be protected by the full weight of the Constitution applies
with equal force to the states. It makes no difference whether the states
or Congress alters those qualifications. The result in either case is pre-
cisely the same. To argue today that Congress and the states retain
power to add their own qualifications to those that are undeniably fixed
in the Constitution would turn history on its head. From the founders'
perspective, it makes no difference whether the reasons now given for
justifying new qualifications might be desirable as a matter of public pol-
icy, as advocates of congressional term limitation have claimed. The fact
remains that the framers made their choice more than two centuries ago
when they enumerated the membership requirements for federal repre-
sentatives, and then agreed that "[t]his Constitution . . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Con-
trary notwithstanding."'15 7 A clear reading of the founders' intentions
leads to the inescapable conclusion that additions to the Standing Quali-
fications Clauses can be achieved only by amending the text of the
Constitution.
III. STANDING QUALIFICATIONS: THE VIEW FROM CONGRESS AND THE
COURTS
In the two centuries since the Philadelphia Convention, both Con-
gress and the Supreme Court have generally construed the Standing
Qualifications Clauses to be the exclusive list of membership require-
ments for federal representatives. Although Congress sporadically has
excluded members for reasons other than those in the text of the Con-
stitution, 158 in Powell v. McCormack,159 the Supreme Court held that
Congress cannot exclude a duly elected member of Congress who other-
wise satisfies the age, residency and citizenship requirements contained
in Article 1.160 Powell leaves little doubt that Congress cannot impose its
own substantive membership rules, such as term limits for incumbent
Senators and Representatives, without violating the Standing Qualifica-
tions Clauses. 16 1 The holding in Powell, moreover, should apply with
equal force to the states.
156. Farrand, supra note 67, at 250.
157. U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. 2 (Supremacy Clause).
158. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 543-47 (1969); see also infra text accom-
panying notes 222-26.
159. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
160. Id. at 548.
161. Id. at 543-47; see also infra text accompanying notes 239-41.
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A. The Maryland Contested Election
While the Court has not squarely addressed whether states can im-
pose their own restrictions on incumbent Senators and Representatives,
the House of Representatives considered and rejected the idea in a spir-
ited 1807 debate over a disputed election in Maryland. The controversy
began when incumbent William McCreery violated an 1802 state law
creating Maryland's fifth congressional district, "which district shall be
entitled to send two Representatives to Congress, one of which shall be a
resident of Baltimore county, and the other a resident of Baltimore city."'162 In
effect, the law imposed additional residency requirements on Article I,
Section 2 of the Constitution, which provides that "[n]o person shall be
a Representative... who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of the
State in which he shall be chosen."'
6 3
McCreery had lived in Baltimore city for many years, but he and his
family began spending summers at his farm in Baltimore county in
1803.164 Since McCreery's service in Congres's required him to spend
winters almost entirely in Washington, he spent virtually no time resid-
ing in Baltimore city. 16 5 In the 1807 election, Baltimore county resident
Nicholas R. Moore received the most votes, entitling him to the fifth
district's "county" seat. McCreery took second place, and Baltimore city
resident Joshua Barney finished third. 166 Barney claimed to have re-
ceived "the highest number of votes given to a candidate legally quali-
fied to represent the city of Baltimore,"' 6 7 and petitioned the House to
seat him pursuant to the Maryland law.' 68 The dispute was referred to
the House Committee of Elections, which issued a report recom-
mending that McCreery be seated. The report concluded:
162. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 871 (1807) (text of the official report by the House Commit-
tee on Elections) (emphasis added). In 1790, moreover, Maryland had passed a law re-
quiring members of Congress to have resided within their districts for twelve months
immediately preceding their election. Id. at 870-71. It does not appear that Maryland was
unique. Representative Philip Key of Maryland (incidentally, the uncle of "Star-Spangled
Banner" author Francis Scott Key) argued that it was imperative for Congress to decide
the constitutionality of the Maryland law because other states had been imposing similar
residency requirements on their U.S. Representatives for the past twenty years. "If the
States have power to add one qualification," Key warned, "they have power to create all."
Id. at 913-14. North Carolina, for instance, had enacted a law requiring its Representatives
to reside in the districts they represented, according to Representative John Rowan of
Kentucky. Id. at 894. It seems likely that Congress's prior willingness to tolerate such laws
was a question of enforcement; the Maryland dispute was simply the first such case to raise
the issue for congressional adjudication. The statements of Key and Rowan support this
view. Rowan, for example, urged the House to settle the matter "because it appeared that
other encroachments had been made on the Constitution." Id.
163. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
164. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 871 (1807).
165. Id. at 871. McCreery was aware that his absence from Baltimore city might violate
the Maryland law "and expressed to some of his friends some apprehensions that excep-
tions might be made on account of his constant family residence not being in the city of
Baltimore." Id. Moreover, in both the 1805 and 1807 congressional elections, McCreery
and his family apparently made a point of residing in Baltimore city for five or six days
before the actual voting. Id.
166. Id.




The committee proceeded to examine the Constitution, with
relation to the case submitted to them, and find that qualifica-
tions of members are therein determined, without reserving
any authority to the State Legislatures to change, add to, or
diminish those qualifications; ... [T]he committee are of the
opinion that William McCreery is duly qualified to represent
the fifth district of the State of Maryland, and that the law of
that State, restricting the residence of the members of Con-
gress to any particular part of the district for which they may be
chosen, is contrary to the Constitution of the United States
169
In the debate that followed, Committee Chairman William Findley
of Pennsylvania-the former Anti-Federalist whose 1787 pamphlet de-
nounced the Constitution for its failure to limit congressional
terms 7 0-urged his colleagues to reject Barney's petition on the
grounds that neither Congress nor the states could add their own re-
quirements to those in the Standing Qualifications Clauses.' 7 1 Summa-
rizing the report's conclusions, Findley observed:
The Committee of Elections considered the qualifications of
members to have been unalterably determined by the Federal
Convention, unless changed by an authority equal to that which framed
the Constitution atfirst; that neither the State nor the Federal Leg-
islatures are vested with authority to add to those qualifica-
tions, so as to change them.'
72
The Committee based its conclusion on several factors. Its most
basic concern was political. Many national lawmakers were undoubtedly
committed to protecting their power against state infringement. The
Committee recognized that letting Maryland prevail in its effort to regu-
late U.S. Representatives could prompt other states to do so. Findley
said:
if the State Legislature had a right to prescribe in what part of
the same district, and for what length of time, each of the Rep-
resentatives should reside, they had also a right to prescribe in
what street or what house of a street they must reside, and for
what length of time.
173
The implications for congressional incumbents such as William Mc-
Creery were all too obvious. As a practical matter, then, it was essential
for the House to take an unequivocal stand against state infringements
on federal power.
It is significant, however, that Findley and many of his colleagues
were willing to go beyond the political to offer complex constitutional
arguments. They were keenly aware that the Maryland election dispute
raised a constitutional issue of profound importance.' 74 Consequently,
169. Id. at 871.
170. See Findley, supra note 72.
171. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 872 (1807).
172. Id. (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 873.
174. Members on both sides of the controversy frequently made this point during the
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the Committee sought to interpret the Standing Qualifications Clauses
in light of Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution, which provides that
"[e]ach House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifi-
cations of its own Members .... 17-5 The Committee construed this
language to mean that the authority to "judge" qualifications was purely
judicial in nature; it did not entitle Congress to create its own, substantive
requirements for who could serve in the national legislature.176 The Stand-
ing Qualifications Clauses provided the framework in which Congress
performed its judicial role, restricting what would otherwise be Con-
gress's virtually open-ended discretion to impose its own substantive
membership qualifications under the guise of judging them.
As the debate unfolded, some members argued that the negative
sentence structure of Article I, Section 2177 was broadly inclusive, and
debate. Typical are the remarks of Representatives Joseph Desha of Kentucky on Nov. 18,
1807, id. at 928 (The Maryland law presented "a question in which a great Constitutional
point was involved."), andJohn Love of Virginia, ia. at 938 (describing it as a "great Con-
stitutional question"). Indeed, Representative Joseph Clay of Pennsylvania moved to
amend the Committee's original resolution to make the constitutional basis for seating
McCreery more explicit. His resolution provided:
Resolved, That the second section of the first article of the Constitution of the
United States, having prescribed the qualifications of the persons who may be
elected Representatives in the Congress of the United States, neither the Con-
gress of the United States nor the Legislature of any of the States, can Constitu-
tionally add to, or take from those qualifications.
Id. at 946 (emphasis in text). The Committee of the Whole rose before Clay's amended
resolution could be voted on, and the McCreery-Barney dispute was then recommitted to
the Election Committee. Id. at 946-47. Many lawmakers were understandably skittish
about deciding the constitutional question presented, and took great pains tojustify their
decision on other grounds.
175. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
176. See, e.g., the comments of Virginia's John Love, who argued that the power dele-
gated to Congress to judge qualifications necessarily prevented it from enacting substan-
tive qualifications for its members. Love told the House: "The functions appear to me to
be entirely distinct, as much so as the power of making the law is distinguished from the
power ofjudging on it when made." 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 900 (1807). Nor is it surprising
that Love and many others construed Congress's function to be purely judicial. Even
though this function had been committed to Congress instead of to the Judiciary, there
was ample precedent for coordinate review elsewhere in the Constitution-particularly in
the provision giving the Senate the sole power to try all impeachments. U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 3.
It appears that the founders also did not find giving Congress a judicial role to be
problematic. Although the enumeration of the standing qualifications for members of
Congress had been hotly debated at the Convention, the delegates approved Congress's
exclusive power to judge those qualifications without debate or a recorded vote. NOTES,
supra note 66, at 431.
Many members of the Tenth Congress were undoubtedly familiar with at least the
basic contours of the debates at the Constitutional Convention twenty years earlier. The
1807 debate reveals that many Representatives were well informed about the Convention
proceedings as well as about the debates in the state ratifying conventions, and they often
referred to The Federalist Papers and other contemporary materials. See, e.g., the remarks by
Representative Key, 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 915-16 (1807) (citing The Federalist Papers for the
proposition that the founders intended the standing qualifications to be fixed and exclu-
sive), and Representative Lemuel Sawyer of North Carolina, id. at 932 (referring to the
John Wilkes Case).
177. "No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained the Age of
twenty-five years, and been seven Years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not,
when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen." U.S. CONsT. art.
I, § 2 (emphasis added).
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urged that the House could refuse to seat only those persons who failed
to satisfy those minimum qualifications.1 78 Representative Rowan of
Kentucky, for instance, stressed that the Times, Places and Manner
Clause of Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution explicitly delegated the
power to define the qualifications of electors to the states. Had the Con-
vention sought to do the same for the elected, it would have done so in
express terms. 179 Maryland's Philip Key expanded this argument by fo-
cusing on the use of qualifications for other federal officeholders. The
prohibitive language of the Standing Qualifications Clauses, he ob-
served, mirrored those for the President.' 80 He continued:
The expressions used in [Article II, Section 1] are in negative
terms, in the same manner as those used with respect to the
qualifications of the Representatives; and does any friend of the
Constitution, say that the States can superinduce or add any
other qualification to the President than those designated by
the Constitution?'
8 1
Other members engaged in a more philosophical inquiry ranging
from federalism, to Madisonian republicanism, to the impact of state-
imposed qualifications on popular sovereignty. In describing his own
views on the Maryland law; Chairman Findley cautioned that allowing
states to create qualifications for national officeholders was antithetical
to both federal supremacy and republican values. With respect to the
first point, Findley asserted that:
The qualifications of the National Legislature are of a national
-character, and as such must be uniform throughout the nation,
and prescribed by the authority of the nation, and by it exclu-
sively; but no State Legislature is vested with national author-
ity, they cannot make citizens for the nation, nor prescribe
qualifications either for citizens or for Executive officers of the
nation, much less can they prescribe qualifications for the Na-
tional Legislature, other than the nation itself has prescribed,
nor abridge the Constitutional power of Congress to decide on
the qualifications of its own members, agreeably to the rules
prescribed by the Constitution; that authority, expressly vested
by the whole, cannot be abridged or changed by a part-by a
seventeenth part of the nation [i.e., the state of Maryland].
18 2
Other Representatives were quick to endorse Findley's view that the
Maryland law was incompatible with the Supremacy Clause. Represen-
tative Rowan, for instance, was convinced that the House should reach
178. As discussed supra notes 120-34 and accompanying text, this view was consistent
with the Federalists' overarching desire to impose qualifications on the electors rather
than the elected.
179. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 893-94 (1807).
180. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1 ("No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen
of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to
the Office of the President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not
have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the
United States.").
181. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 914 (1807).
182. Id. at 873.
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the constitutional question legitimately before it. "Whilst [Rowan] re-
lied on the State sovereignties," he is reported as saying, "he also re-
vered the National sovereignty, as one, without which, the State
sovereignties could not be preserved; and by which, if the State sover-
eignties were assailed, they could alone be rescued."' 8 3 Rowan likened
the relationship between the federal government and the states to that
between the states and their counties. A state's function in drawing con-
gressional districts, he argued, was solely "for the convenience of the
electors, and not in abridgment of their rights."'
18 4
The Maryland law also struck at the heart of Madisonian republican-
ism. Opponents of the Maryland law insisted that members of Congress
were federal officers, not merely agents of the states. In rejecting the
Articles of Confederation and embracing a republican form of central
government, the founders necessarily abandoned the states' claims to
equal power in matters affecting the national legislature. Congress was
not merely to reflect the parochial interests of each member's home
state, but was to "refine and enlarge the public views,' 8 5 fusing them
into a national outlook through a combination of experience and delib-
eration.18 6 Although McCreery was elected from Maryland, his actions
as a U.S. Representative responsible for declaring war or raising taxes
were binding on the people in every state. Each U.S. citizen, therefore,
had a vital federal interest in every member of the House, regardless of
which state elected him to serve in Congress. In Representative Key's
words, "the people in each State are interested in the qualifications of
the Representatives of every State, and no one State can destroy the
right."1
8 7
This last point leads to what appears to have been the most widely
shared constitutional objection to the Maryland law: that it infringed
upon popular sovereignty in national elections. Key, Findley and many
other members believed that allowing states to impose qualifications on
the elected as well as the electors would compromise the federal
franchise. Although McCreery finished ahead of Barney, Maryland law
denied the majority of the electors the right to their choice. That those
same electors may have voted for the state legislators who enacted the
Maryland law was irrelevant. A state had nonetheless claimed the right
to restrict the franchise in national elections-a direct violation of fed-
eral constitutional supremacy. Representative Rowan spoke for many
when he argued that the inclusive nature of the Standing Qualifications
Clause of Article I, Section 2 had been designed to safeguard the elec-
tors' freedom to elect candidates without interference from Congress or
the states. Letting the states "superadd" qualifications, he noted, would
subvert that freedom.
188
183. Id. at 896.
184. Id. at 394.
185. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 62 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
186. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
187. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 913 (1807).
188. Id. at 894.
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Rowan reminded his colleagues that the delegates to the Philadel-
phia Convention of 1787 had represented the people, not the states qua
states.' 8 9 Key agreed, stating: "[tihe Convention who formed the Con-
stitution of the United States, represented not the States, but the people
of the United States. They met to form not a State government, but a
National Government for the people of the United States."' 9 0 Because
the people, and not the states, were the true source of popular sover-
eignty in the House, Key emphatically rejected the notion that the
Times, Places and Manner Clause of Article I, Section 4 could justify
state-imposed qualifications on federal officeholders, saying:
It has been said, but faintly relied on, that if the States have
power to fix election districts for the electors, they may equally
locate the Representative. But this is a great mistake. The Con-
stitution, in permitting the States to determine the manner of
holding elections, permits them, if it suits their convenience, to
hold them in districts; but the attempt to curtail and rob the
people of their elective franchise, by making the eligibility of
the candidate depend on the locality of his residence, is out of
their power, and not given to them by the Constitution. As to
the propriety and policy of such power being placed in a State, it is not
now a question. We are not framing a constitution. We are examining
where it is placed by our Constitution. If it is not well placed, there is a
Constitutional mode of altering it.1 9 1
Key advocated taking a firm stand against the Maryland law and other
encroachments on popular sovereignty by states purporting to regulate
federal election procedures under the Times, Places and Manner Clause:
"like water dropping on a stone, [they] wear away the very substance of
the Constitution."'1
92
Not all members of the Committee, however, shared Key's views.
Leading a small but vocal group of dissenters, most of them from South-
ern states, was Virginia's John Randolph, who repeatedly warned the
House that adjudicating the constitutionality of the Maryland law could
have catastrophic consequences, possibly triggering a popular backlash.
Claiming that the House had never been called upon to decide a more
important question, Randolph "laid it down as a principle not to be
questioned, that Congress should never undertake to pronounce upon
State regulations, but in cases too clear to admit a contest ... "193 Any
other principle would render the states "mere skeletons of Governments
... [amounting to] the death warrant of the existing Constitution, and of
the people's liberties."' 9 4 Randolph confronted his colleagues with the
grim consequences of striking down a state law on federal constitutional
grounds: "Beware lest, whilst you proudly assert your power, you do
189. Id.
190. Id. at 911.
191. Id. at 913 (emphasis added).
192. Id. at 914.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 882-83.
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not meet the reprobation of the great body of the American people." 195
It was not that Randolph and like-minded legislators were philo-
sophically opposed to the House adjudicating a constitutional question.
They were concerned, rather, that most Representatives would reject
their arguments that either the Times, Places and Manner Clause or the
Tenth Amendment reserved to the states the power to impose their own
qualifications on members of Congress. 19 6 Consequently, Randolph and
his allies focused on persuading their colleagues to avoid the constitu-
tional issue even if they decided to seat McCreery. Thus, when it be-
came clear that the vast majority of members favored seating McCreery
instead of Barney, Randolph tried to amend the House resolution to
construe the Maryland law in McCreery's favor-in effect deciding the
constitutional question in favor of the states. 197 This attempt failed by a
vote of 8-92.198 Yet Randolph's pressure ultimately paid off. After sev-
eral sustained debates over the span of more than a month, the House
voted 89-18 to approve a resolution that stated simply "[t]hat William
McCreery is entitled to his seat in this House."1 9 9 The result permitted
both sides to claim that Congress had avoided a touchy constitutional
issue. But given the posture of the McCreery-Barney dispute, the Com-
mittee's report, and the substance of the ensuing debate on the House
floor, the House's attempt to decide the case on non-constitutional
grounds is unpersuasive since the vast majority of House members had
rejected a state's right to impose substantive qualifications on Congress.
Despite the passage of nearly two centuries, there is reason to be-
lieve that the House's result in the Maryland Contested Election is con-
trolling constitutional precedent even today. 20 0 In contrast, Randolph's
195. Id. at 886.
196. Just as Key, Findley, Rowan and others scoffed at suggestions that the Times,
Places and Manner Clause entitled the states to impose substantive requirements on fed-
eral officeholders, Randolph and his supporters failed to persuade the vast majority of his
colleagues that the Tenth Amendment -was controlling. Again, the fundamental debate
was over the source of state and federal power under the Constitution. On one hand,
Randolph supporters argued that because the Constitution does not expressly prohibit
states from imposing residency requirements, they must retain that power under the
Tenth Amendment. Id. at 907. Thus, the people's rights derived from the states them-
selves. But most Representatives disagreed, believing that the standing qualifications in
Article I could not be infringed by the states because they had been enacted by the people
themselves, through their delegates to the Constitutional Convention. See, e.g., the re-
marks of Representative Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts, who observed that the Tenth
Amendment "was a delegation of powers in the Constitution, not merely to the States, but
to the people, who constituted those States. The language of the Constitution was not we
the States, but we the people of those States. Their power derived from the people; they were
responsible for the exercise of that power to the people, and not to the States." Id. (em-
phasis in original).
197. Randolph's resolution stated that McCreery was to be seated because he was the
candidate "having the qualifications required by the law of Maryland." Id. at 1234.
198. Id. at 1237 (1807).
199. Id. See also ASHER C. HINDS, I PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE UNITED STATES § 414 (1907).
200. There is no longer any question, for instance, that the Constitution prohibits
states from requiring U.S. Representatives to reside in the districts they represent, so long
as they satisfy the inhabitancy provision of Article I, § 2 of the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F.2d 1523, 1529 n.4 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983)
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theory of retained states' rights is of diminished credibility in the post-
Civil War era. The House debates reveal that one of his primary motiva-
tions for supporting the constitutionality of the Maryland law was to
protect Southern slave-owning interests, a concern that is no longer ap-
plicable in the wake of the Reconstruction Amendments. Randolph ar-
gued that if the Committee's original resolution was adopted, and the
Maryland law struck down as unconstitutional, the "monstrous and
abominable conclusion" would be that slave-owning states would be le-
gally powerless to disqualify black men from serving in Congress.
20 1
Undoubtedly Randolph's remarks were rhetorical; his colleagues scoffed
at what must have seemed the wildly improbable notion that the South-
ern states would begin electing African-Americans to Congress.20 2 Still,
Randolph's appeals on behalf of pro-slavery interests not only help ex-
plain his reluctance to acknowledge the supremacy of federal power, but
also suggest why his conception of retained states' rights-which made
him a dissenter even in the early 19th century-is even less compelling
today.203
B. From William McCreery to Adam Clayton Powell
1. Jefferson's Reflections on the Maryland Election.
The House debate over seating William McCreery remains the sin-
gle most exhaustive discussion on the constitutionality of state-imposed
(listing cases holding that state laws rendering officials ineligible for state office prescribe
unconstitutional qualifications); Signorelli v. Evans, 637 F.2d 853, 859 (2d Cir. 1980)
("State laws that require a Congressional candidate to live within the Congressional dis-
trict he seeks to represent have uniformly been invalidated as imposing an additional qual-
ification, notwithstanding the candidate's freedom to move into the district.").
Interestingly, another incumbent U.S. Representative from Maryland was unsuccess-
fully challenged in 1808 on grounds virtually identical to those raised in the McCreery-
Barney dispute. See 18 ANNALS OF CONG. 1848-49 (1808). For a more recent Maryland
case, see Hellman v. Collier, 141 A.2d 908, 910 (Md. 1958) (invalidating state statute re-
quiring a House candidate to live in the congressional district he sought to represent). In
the years since the Maryland Contested Election, however, both Congress and the federal
courts have sometimes relied on the Times, Places and Manner Clause to exclude mem-
bers for failing to follow certain state laws regulating federal election procedures, but not
otherwise preventing them from running for Congress. See infra notes 244-307 and ac-
companying text.
201. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 888-89 (1807).
202. In countering Randolph, Representative Quincy raised an equally implausible sce-
nario: "Suppose that one of the Northern States should say that none but a black man or a
man of color should be elected." Id. at 908-09(emphasis in original). Quincy admitted that
he never expected this would happen, but wanted to remind Randolph that the states'
power to superadd qualifications to national lawmakers could also be destructive of South-
ern interests. Id at 909. There is, of course, a well-deserved irony in Randolph's choice of
hyperbole: the Southern states did elect a number of black Representatives to Congress
during Reconstruction. In fact, four black veterans of the victorious Union Army later
went on to serve in Congress. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION 6 (1988).
203. However, one modern writer claims support for state-imposed term limits based
on the practice of many Southern state legislatures to "instruct" their U.S. Senators-that
is, to bind them to vote a certain way on a particular issue. See Kelly, supra note 8, at 7.
Supporters of the 1990 term limit campaign in Colorado argued that the practice of in-
struction was never subjected to constitutional challenge. Id. It is questionable, however,
whether instruction is relevant-let alone persuasive-evidence of the constitutionality of
modern term limitation proposals, especially now that Senators are popularly elected.
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qualifications on members of Congress. While Congress and the federal
courts have had several occasions to consider whether Congress can de-
fine the qualifications of its own members, no case involving the consti-
tutionality of state additions to the Standing Qualifications Clauses has
been raised. This is probably not surprising. The House vote in the
Maryland Contested Election was widely reported by scholarly commen-
tators, and its influence was widely felt. In the decades following the
Maryland election dispute, state laws imposing qualifications on federal
officeholders fell into desuetude.
This is not to suggest, however, that the House's decision was the
final word on the matter. Thomas Jefferson was uncertain whether the
House's decision in the Maryland Contested Election meant that the
states were absolutely forbidden to impose qualifications on their fed-
eral representatives. When his longtime friend and confidant Virginia
state Senator Joseph C. Cabell asked his opinion, Jefferson replied that
while he had initially agreed with the decision to seat William McCreery,
he now doubted "the correctness of my first opinion. ' 20 4 Grounding his
arguments solely in the text of the Constitution, without reference to the
framing or other historical evidence, Jefferson agreed with Cabell that
the Standing Qualifications Clause of Article I, Section 2 could plausibly
be understood as the minimum, but not exclusive, set of requirements
for congressional service when read in light of the Tenth Amend-
ment.20 5 Because the language of the Constitution does not expressly
prohibit states from imposing qualifications on members of Congress,
Jefferson continued, it was conceivable that the states retained such
power.
20 6
In summarizing his conclusions, Jefferson cautioned Cabell:
This reasoning appears to me to be sound; but on so recent a
change of view, caution requires us not to be too confident, and
that we admit this to be one of the doubtful questions on which
honest men may differ with the purest motives; and the more
readily, as we find we have differed from ourselves on it.2 0 7
Jefferson warned that state-imposed qualifications on members of Con-
gress were best avoided because they called for adjudicating sensitive
constitutional issues that threatened to generate needless friction be-
tween the central government and the states:
I have always thought where the line of demarcation between
the powers of the General and the State governments was
doubtfully or indistinctly drawn, it would be prudent and
praiseworthy in both parties, never to approach it but under
the most urgent necessity. Is the necessity now urgent, to de-
clare that no non-resident of his district shall be eligible as a
member of Congress? It seems to me that, in practice, the par-
204. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell (Jan. 31, 1814), in THE FOUN-






tialities of the people are a sufficient security against such an
election; and that if, in any instance, they should ever choose a
non-resident, it must be one of such eminent merit and qualifi-
cations, as would make it a good, rather than an evil; and that,
in any event, the examples will be so rare, as never to amount
to a serious evil. If the case then be neither clear nor urgent,
would it not be better to let it lie undisturbed? Perhaps its de-
cision may never be called for.
2 08
In Jefferson's view, the benefits of state-imposed qualifications on fed-
eral representatives were illusory. The people should be trusted to pick
the most meritorious candidates to represent them in Congress. More-
over, such qualifications might be costly to federalism, given the poten-
tial for a constitutional standoff between Congress and the states.
Jefferson's reluctance to let the states add qualifications to those
fixed by the Constitution is compelling. While not an Anti-Federalist, he
had long championed states' rights. Jeffersonian republicanism was sy-
nonymous with circumscribed national power. Toward this end, Jeffer-
son himself had advocated term limitation for federal officeholders since
the days of the Declaration of Independence.2 0 9 It might be easily
imagined that if Jefferson had been a U.S. Representative in 1807, in-
stead of President, he would have joined his fellow Virginians in sup-
porting the constitutionality of the Maryland residency law. Instead, he
agreed with the House's decision until challenged by Cabell, and even
then warned against any state-imposed qualifications on members of
Congress except "under the most urgent necessity."
2 10
2. Justice Story's Commentaries.
Jefferson's doubts about the House's decision in the Maryland Con-
tested Election were in turn questioned by Justice Joseph Story, one of
the greatest constitutional scholars of the era. In his Commentaries on the
Constitution,2 1 I Story argued that Jefferson erred by telling Cabell that
states could impose substantive qualifications on federal officials if ex-
traordinary circumstances warranted them.
Story suggested that Jefferson, "with his avowed devotion to state
power, '"212 had been blinded to the true source of congressional author-
ity. Jefferson's reading of the Tenth Amendment failed to recognize
that "no powers could be reserved to the states, except those, that ex-
208. Id.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
210. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Cabell (Jan. 31, 1814), in THE FOUNDERS'
CoNsrrrTUrION, supra note 41, at 81. The wording ofJefferson's letter indicates that it was
Cabell who first suggested that states could impose qualifications on members of Con-
gress; Jefferson responded that he had never even considered the idea until he received
Cabell's letter. Id. The fact that Cabell was apparently trying to persuade his close friend
of the correctness of his position may be significant. Jefferson responded that Cabell's
opinion was "sound," but then cautioned him against taking action. Id.
211. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 2: §§ 612-28, reprinted in THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTIrrUON, supra note 41, at 81.
212. Id. at 84.
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isted in the states before the Constitution was adopted." 21 3 In reality,
Story argued, it was the Constitutional Convention-and not the
states-that created the national government. Consequently, Con-
gress's authority can only come from the Constitution itself. Like other
federal officeholders, members of Congress owe their existence to the
people, whose delegates created the Constitution.
The truth is, that the states can exercise no powers whatsoever,
which exclusively spring out of the existence of the national
government, which the Constitution does not delegate to them.
They have just as much right, and no more, to prescribe new
qualifications for a representative, as they have for a president.
Each is an officer of the Union, deriving his powers and qualifi-
cations from the Constitution, and neither created by, depen-
dent upon, nor controllable by, the states. It is no original
prerogative of state power to appoint a representative, a sena-
tor, or a president for the Union. Those officers owe their
existence and functions to the united voice of the whole, not a
portion of, the people. Before a state can assert the right, it
must show, that the Constitution has delegated and recognized
it. No state can say, that it has reserved, what it never
possessed.
2 14
Moving from constitutional theory to practice, Story warned that
state-imposed restrictions on congressional service threatened to read
the Standing Qualifications Clauses out of the Constitution. Had the
Maryland residency law at issue in 1807 been upheld, other states might
have prescribed "that a representative should be forty years of age, and
a citizen for ten years. In each case, the very qualification fixed by the
Constitution is completely evaded, and indirectly abolished.
'2 15
Justice Story's critique is no less persuasive today, at a time when
several supporters of the term limitation movement have resurrected
Thomas Jefferson's Tenth Amendment theory to defend state-based ini-
tiatives2 16 such as that passed in Colorado. The notion that states can
213. Id. (emphasis added).
214. Id. § 626 at 84. Story's theory of federal power is consistent with statements made
on the House floor in 1807 by several opponents of Maryland's residency law. See, e.g., the
remarks of Representative Key, supra text accompanying note 190.
215. STORY, supra note 211, at 85.
216. Admittedly, Story assumed that state legislatures such as Maryland's were impos-
ing qualifications on federal officials, and were not amending their state constitutions
through the initiative process. As his Commentaries acknowledge: "A state, and the legisla-
ture of a state, are quite different political beings." Id. § 627 at 84. Story observed, how-
ever, that the Tenth Amendment does not reserve powers to the states exclusively, as
political bodies, but to the states or the people. Id. Story also implicitly drew a further
distinction-and, for our purposes, a more important one-between the people of a given
state and "the whole people of the United States," id. at 85, whose delegates framed the
Constitution. Just as the states cannot impose qualifications on federal officers, the people
of those states cannot do so either-unless, of course, they amend the U.S. Constitution.
Thus, extending Story's reasoning, it makes no difference whether congressional term lim-
its are imposed by a state law or by popular amendments to a state constitution. From the
standpoint of federal constitutional law, the only salient point is that the Standing Qualifi-
cations Clauses for members of Congress are fixed by the Constitution itself. Changing
them means changing the Constitution.
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bar congressional incumbents from standing for re-election depends on
interpreting the Tenth Amendment to deny the federal government all
powers not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. 21 7 This view is un-
convincing for the same reasons that led Story to reject it in 1833. This
argument rests on the flawed premise that states retain powers which
they never had. Federal power, including that which created Congress,
derives from "We the People," and not-as Jefferson supposed-from
"We the States." When the people's delegates chose the Standing Qual-
ifications Clauses as the exclusive criteria for congressional service, they
necessarily barred Congress and the states from imposing their own
qualifications. Nothing prevents the people from changing their minds
now, but to do so they must also change the supreme embodiment of
their will: the text of the Constitution.
3. Congressionally Imposed Qualifications Prior to Powell.
Although Congress has not considered the constitutionality of
state-imposed qualifications on national lawmakers since 1807, it has oc-
casionally excluded duly elected members for reasons other than those
enumerated in the Standing Qualifications Clauses. 2 18 The first such in-
cident occurred in 1868, when a House dominated by radical republi-
cans voted to exclude two members-elect accused of giving aid and
comfort to the Confederacy. 21 9 The Senate quickly followed suit, ex-
cluding a member-elect accused of the same offense. 22 0 As one com-
mentator has concluded, "[t]his change was produced by the North's
bitter enmity toward those who failed to support the Union cause during
the war.... It was a shift brought about by the naked urgency of power
and was given little doctrinal support." 22
1
217. For example, the brochure distributed by the Colorado term limit campaign prior
to the 1990 election assures voters: "According to the U.S. Constitution, we do have the
right to limit terms." TERM LIMITATIONS, supra note 22. After reciting the text of the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the brochure proposes a theory of retained rights that, in
its essential features, is identical to the view espoused by Jefferson in 1814 and later dis-
credited by Story:
What this means is that the federal government has only those powers explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution. On any matter on which the Constitution is si-
lent, the states, or the people, have the right to do what they want. There is no
mention in the Constitution, pro or con, on limiting the tenure of Congressman
[sic] and senators. So, according to both the plain meaning of the Constitution,
and the intent of the Founding Fathers, as described in the Federalist Papers and
other documents, if a state, by vote of the people, should decide to limit terms of
its federal representatives, it has the right to do so.
Id.
218. For a detailed historical account of those instances, see Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486, 543L47 (1969). For most of the 19th century, Congress steadfastly opposed
efforts to create additional qualifications. This pressure intensified during and immedi-
ately following the Civil War, when both the House and Senate initially resisted several
attempts to exclude members-elect accused of disloyalty to the Union. Id. at 544 n.80.
219. 1 HINDS, supra note 199, §§ 449-51, 464.
220. SENATE ELECTION, EXPULSION AND CENSURE CASES, S. Doc. No. 71 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 21 (1962).
221. Comment, Legislative Exclusion: Julian Bond and Adam Clayton Powell, 35 U. CHI. L.
REV. 151, 157 (1967).
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From the Reconstruction era to Powell v. McCormack,2 22 congres-
sional exclusion was sporadic and unprincipled. Congress refused to
seat members-elect for "offenses" ranging from socialist beliefs, 223 to
polygamy, 22 4 to selling appointments to the U.S. military and naval
academies. 22 5 The Senate successfully excluded a member for the last
time in 1929,226 and in 1967, the House's exclusion of Representative
Adam Clayton Powell of New York ended a congressional practice remi-
niscent of that used by Parliament in refusing to seat John Wilkes.
C. The Powell Decision
In Powell v. McCormack,2 2 7 the Supreme Court for the first time con-
fronted the question whether Congress's authority to judge the qualifi-
cations of its members included the power to create qualificatiors not
enumerated in the Standing Qualifications Clauses. The case was
brought by longstanding incumbent Representative Adam Clayton Pow-
ell of New York, who, in 1966, had been re-elected to serve in the Nine-
tieth Congress. During the previous Congress, a special House
subcommittee had concluded that Powell and members of his staff had
deceived House authorities about certain travel expenses. 2 28 The Com-
mittee's report also presented strong evidence that Powell had ordered
illegal salary payments be made to his wife. 229 The House took no for-
mal action against Powell during the Eighty-Ninth Congress. 23 0 Prior to
the organization of the Ninetieth Congress, however, the Democratic
members-elect met in caucus and voted to remove Powell as chairman of
the Committee on Education and Labor.
2 3 '
When the Ninetieth Congress officially convened in January 1967,
Powell's colleagues asked him to step aside while the oath of office was
administered to the other members-elect. 23 2 The House then convened
a second investigating committee to determine whether Powell was eligi-
ble to take his seat. 233 Upon the Committee's first invitation to appear
before them, Powell gave only limited testimony. 234 Following a second
invitation, Powell refused to testify, arguing that the standing qualifica-
tions were the exclusive requirements for congressional service, and that
222. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
223. See, e.g., CLARENCE CANNON, 6 PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE UNITED STATES §§ 56-59 (1935) (exclusion of Representative Victor L. Berger).
224. See, e.g., I HINDS, supra note 199, §§ 473, 477-80.
225. See 2 Hinds id. § 1273.
226. See CANNON, supra note 223, § 180. A 1947 effort to exclude Senator Theodore G.
Bilbo of Mississippi for illegally intimidating black voters in Democratic primaries, and for
allegedly accepting gifts from war contractors, ended when he died. 93 CONG. REC. 3-28
(1947).
227. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).






234. Id. Powell requested an adversarial-type procedure be instituted, and when this
request was refused, he testified only as to his age, citizenship and residency.
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members could not be punished or expelled unless they had first been
seated.235 When the committee reported that Powell had engaged in
various other improprieties, the House finally passed a resolution ex-
cluding Powell and declaring his seat vacant.2 36 Powell and several vot-
ers from New York's Eighteenth Congressional District then brought
suit against the House, seeking a declaratory judgment that he had been
improperly excluded. 23 7 While the case was pending, the Ninetieth Con-
gress terminated; Powell was seated as a member of the Ninety-First
Congress. 23 8
Writing for an 8-1 majority, Chief Justice Warren concluded "that
the Constitution leaves the House without authority to exclude any per-
son, duly elected by his constituents, who meets all the requirements for
membership expressly prescribed in the Constitution. '- 23 9 Thus, "in
judging the qualifications of its members, Congress is limited to the
standing qualifications prescribed in the Constitution. '2 40 That rule,
which the Court has followed to this day, prevents Congress from using
Article I, Section 5 to create substantive qualifications for its
members.
24 1
In holding that the Standing Qualifications Clauses are the exclu-
sive set of criteria for congressional service, the Powell Court based its
decision on an exhaustive review of "the relevant historical materi-
als."' 24 2 These materials were not limited to qualifications created by
Congress. Rather, the Court also cited the John Wilkes Case and the
Convention debates, as well as the outcome of the Maryland Contested
Election, to support its expansive conclusion that the standing qualifica-
tions are fixed by the text of the Constitution. 24 3 Thus, while the issue
of state-imposed qualifications was not directly before the Court, the na-
ture of the materials used by the Powell Court strongly suggests that
state-imposed qualifications are invalid as well.
235. lId at 492.
236. l
237. Id. at 493.
238. Id. at 495.
239. Id. Although Powell involved a U.S. Representative, the Court emphasized that its
holding applied with equal force to the Senate since Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution
applies to both houses of Congress. Id at n.44.
240. Id at 550.
241. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 133 (1976). In invalidating several portions of
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the Buckley Court, citing Powell, observed:
The power of each House to judge whether one claiming election as a Senator or
Representative has met the requisite qualifications . . . cannot reasonably be
translated into a power granted to the Congress itself to impose substantive qual-
ifications on the right to so hold office. Whatever power Congress may have to
legislate such qualifications must derive from § 4, rather than § 5, of Article I.
Id The constitutionality of using the Times, Placei and Manner Clause of Article I, Sec-
tion 4 of the Constitution as a basis for federal term limitation is examined infra notes 244-
307 and accompanying text.
242. Powell, 395 U.S. at 522.
243. Id. at 527-31, 542-47.
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IV. TERM LIMITS AND THE TIMES, PLACES AND MANNER CLAUSE
Despite the Court's holding in Powell and substantial historical evi-
dence suggesting that the Standing Qualifications Clauses are the exclu-
sive requirements for congressional service, term limit supporters offer
two theories to defend the constitutionality of state initiatives. The first
argument simply revives Jefferson's 1814 theory of unenumerated
rights. 244 According to this line of analysis, states retain the right to bar
congressional incumbents from standing for re-election under the
Tenth Amendment because the Constitution does not expressly prohibit
such restrictions. 24 5 The second theory takes a different approach. It
asserts that the Times, Places and Manner Clause of Article I, Section
4,246 which permits states to establish procedures for electing U.S. Sena-
tors and Representatives, also includes a substantive component al-
lowing states to prevent incumbents from seeking re-election.
According to this view, a state may legitimately conclude that its mem-
bers of Congress wield so much power-in the form of campaign finance
laws and "the array of incumbent-protections Congress has created on
its own behalf" 24 7-that elections have become ineffective as a means of
determining true voter preferences. To halt "this erosion of competi-
tive Democracy by Congress," 24 8 states may invoke the Times, Places
and Manner Clause to bar incumbents from seeking re-election, thereby
restoring integrity to the manner of federal elections.
While this second theory has attracted widespread public attention,
it depends on the same faulty premise as the first: that the Standing
Qualifications Clauses are not the exclusive criteria for congressional
244. See supra text accompanying notes 205-206.
245. See id.
246. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elec-
tions for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except
as to the Places of chusing Senators.")
247. Editorial, supra note 29. Examples of "incumbent protections" include congres-
sional staff, targeted mailings to constituents (in the form of newsletters and casework),
and franking and long-distance phone privileges.
248. Glazier, supra note 29. The Wall StreetJournal's editorial board echoed this senti-
ment in an editorial praising both Glazier's earlier article (which appeared on the opinions
page) and the Colorado initiative. The editorial distinguishes Powell on the facts and, more
importantly, on the grounds that:
ti]ts argument against Congressional exclusion was based on the principle that in
a democracy the people should be able to elect whom they please. But surely the
near-impossibility of defeating an incumbent today allows Colorado voters to
democratically decide that the only way they can easily remove incumbents is to
limit terms.
Id. The editorial observes that term limitation "is admittedly a blunt weapon," but warns
that without it, "citizen interest and participation in politics will continue to plummet as
elections more and more seem a sullen ratification of the status quo, rather than competi-
tive contests." Id
Cortez and Macaulay make essentially the same point in their article supporting the
Colorado initiative's constitutionality. Cortez & Macaulay, supra note 29. They conclude:
"With mounting evidence that the electoral process is operating so as to keep virtually
every incumbent in office as long as he or she chooses to run, the need to protect legiti-
mate state interests should be manifest." Id. at 2198.
[Vol. 69:1'
THE NEW ANTI-FEDERALISM
service.24 9 It is beyond doubt that the Times, Places and Manner Clause
lets states regulate the machinery of federal elections. But it does not
empower states to deny congressional membership to persons who
otherwise meet the standing qualifications of age, residency and citizen-
ship. The Standing Qualifications Clauses of sections 2 and 3 are sub-
stantive rules, defining who is eligible to serve in the House and Senate,
respectively. In contrast, Section 4 allows states to design the procedures
for their election. Together, these three clauses are part of a coherent
scheme; they simply cannot be read in isolation. Importing a substan-
tive component into the word "Manner" so that states may define who is
eligible to serve in Congress can have but one result: to achieve indi-
rectly what the Standing Qualifications Clauses directly forbid. Neither
history nor the relevant case law supports this view. Indeed, courts have
uniformly rejected state attempts to use the Times, Places and Manner
Clause to add congressional qualifications to those enumerated in the
Constitution.
A. The Ballot Access Cases
Supporters of the Times, Places and Manner Clause theory claim
that a line of cases denying ballot access to independent party candi-
dates in congressional elections means that states may disqualify any po-
tential candidate so long as they do not violate the First or Fourteenth
Amendments. Adherents of this view admit that the states have never
construed the Times, Places and Manner Clause in quite this way.
2 50
Nonetheless, they assert that a 1974 Supreme Court decision, Storer v.
Brown,2 5 1 and a lower court ballot-access case, Williams v. Tucker,25 2 jus-
tify reading the Clause with such breadth. 2 53 These decisions, however,
only permit states to deny ballot access for valid procedural reasons.
Neither case lets states impose their own substantive qualifications for
holding congressional office.
At issue in Storer was a California law that denied a place on the
ballot to independent candidates who voted in the immediately preced-
ing primary, or who had registered with a qualified political party less
than one year prior to the immediately preceding primary election.25 4
The law also required persons seeking ballot status as independent
249. Advocates of both theories take the position that Powell was either wrongly de-
cided or does not apply to qualifications created by the states. See, e.g., Editorial, supra note
29 (stressing that the Powell Court "was silent on the issue of state regulation"). A variant
of this view stresses that even ifPowell was correctly decided, its holding is based solely on
Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution. Consequently, states are free to add their own
qualifications under Section 4 so long as they do not infringe the First or Fourteenth
Amendment rights of candidates or the voters. Cortez & Macaulay, supra note 29, at 2194.
250. In Glazier's words, the clause "has never been used by the states to limit the right
of a congressional incumbent to stand for re-election, which may be the reason that some
mistakenly assume that such limitations can be enacted only by constitutional amend-
ment." Glazier, supra note 29.
251. 415 U.S. 724 (1973).
252. 382 F.Supp. 381 (D. Pa. 1974).
253. See generally Glazier, supra note 29.
254. 415 U.S. at 726.
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party candidates to file nominating papers signed by a certain number of
voters at least sixty days prior to the general election.25 5 Storer and
Frammhagen had been registered Democrats in early 1972, but sought
ballot status as independent candidates for Congress in the November
general elections. 2 56 Two other plaintiffs, members of the Communist
Party, claimed the right to be independent candidates for President and
Vice President.25 7 Storer and Frammhagen claimed that the California
provision not only violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 2 58
but that it also added qualifications for congressional office in violation
of Article I, Section 2.259
In a 6-3 decision, the Court upheld the law,2 60 concluding that it
was an "integral part of the entire election process" 2 6 1 by which the
state's voters selected public officers. Although a state's disaffiliation
condition cannot unduly burden the right of independent candidates or
their supporters to associate for political purposes under the First
Amendment, or to vote effectively under the Equal Protection
Clause, 26 2 the Court ruled that California had a legitimate interest in
protecting its direct primary process by refusing to recognize independ-
ent candidates who failed to make early plans to leave a party and take
the alternative course to the ballot.
26 3
Storer established an analytical framework for evaluating whether a
state law violates the Standing Qualifications Clauses or the Times,
Places and Manner Clause. The first step is to determine whether the
state law at issue is designed to regulate election procedures. If so, the
Court proceeds to examine that process to determine whether the
state's interest is sufficiently strong to overcome any First or Fourteenth
Amendment concerns. If, however, the state law does not regulate elec-
tion procedures, but instead makes certain persons ineligible to serve in
Congress, the Court must then decide if the law violates the Standing
Qualifications Clauses by imposing additional qualifications on mem-
bers of Congress.
26 4
255. Id. at 726-27.
256. Ia at 727.
257. Id. at 728.
258. Id. at 727-28.
259. Id. at 728.
260. The dissenters would have held that the law unduly infringed the First and Four-
teenth Amendment rights of independent candidates and their supporters. Id at 756
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
261. Id at 735.
262. Id at 729.
263. Id. at 735. Because the California primary was the first stage in a process designed
"to winnow out and finally reject all but the chosen candidates," id, allowing defeated
primary candidates to win a place on the general election ballot would not only undermine
the procedures with which the major political parties selected their candidates, but confuse
the voters. As the Court observed: "The people, it is hoped, are presented with under-
standable choices and the winner in the general election with sufficient support to govern
effectively." Id.
264. Applying this framework, the Storer Court held that the statute was concerned with
maintaining the integrity of California's election process. Moreover, the plaintiffs could
have registered with a qualified party within the proper time frame and sought its nomina-
tion, see id. at 746 n. 16, or filed nominating papers for ballot status as independent candi-
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Williams v. Tucker 26 5 applied the Storer framework to uphold a Penn-
sylvania statute preventing an incumbent Representative, who had been
defeated in his party's primary, from having his name placed on the gen-
eral election ballot as an independent candidate. 2 66 Pennsylvania's elec-
tion code established two methods of nomination for Congress:
candidates could either seek to be nominated in a political party primary
election, or file nominating papers signed by a certain number of in-
dependent voters.26 7 However, the law barred candidates who failed to
win their party's primary from filing nomination papers for the general
election.26 8 After Representative Williams's defeat in the Republican
primary, he attempted to run as an independent and ultimately landed
in court, where he presented the same constitutional objections as had
the plaintiffs in Storer.2 69 Applying the Storer framework, the district
court characterized the state law as procedural, and then rejected argu-
ments that it infringed the plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. 2 70 And, as in Storer, the court brushed aside Williams's claim that
the statute violated the Standing Qualifications Clause. 2 7 1 According to
the court, the statute "merely regulates the manner of holding elections
and does not add qualifications for office."' 2 72 By equating the word
"manner" with election procedures, Williams directly undercuts the no-
tion that the Times, Places and Manner Clause permits states to regulate
the qualifications for congressional service.
Ironically, some commentators claim that these two ballot-access
cases support the theory that the Times, Places and Manner Clausejusti-
fies state-imposed term limits on members of Congress. Writing in The
Wall Street Journal, New York attorney Stephen Glazier characterizes Wil-
liams as holding that "states can restrict access of congressional incum-
bents to the ballot, by using one-year waiting periods before running for
re-election, in order to pursue the Storer state interest in an effective
election process. ' 27 3 Speaking of these cases and the "resign-to-run"
decisions discussed below, Glazier concludes:
The thrust of these cases is that the actions of a democratically
elected state government will not be frustrated by the "no addi-
tional qualifications" clauses, if the state limits candidates for
its congressional races in a way that does not offend freedom of
speech or equal protection and that pursues some state
interest.
2 74
Glazier's analysis of the cases may be tantalizing. However, it all
dates. See id. Instead, they failed to comply with either procedure. In no sense was
California prescribing qualifications for congressional eligibility.
265. 382 F. Supp. 381 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 383.
268. Id. at 384.
269. Id. at 385-87.
270. Id. at 388.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Glazier, supra note 29.
274. Id.
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but ignores their doctrinal significance. Storer establishes a two-part in-
quiry for applying the Times, Places and Manner Clause: 1) Does the
state law in question regulate election procedures for congressional can-
didates, and 2) if so, does the state have a legitimate interest in those
procedures that is sufficiently compelling to outweigh First and Four-
teenth Amendment values? If, however, a state law purports to disqual-
ify an entire class of persons from standing for re-election-as
congressional term limits would do in the case of incumbents-then the
Times, Places and Manner Clause simply does not apply.
Glazier argues that all state election laws, even those imposing di-
rect restrictions on the eligibility of persons to serve in Congress, should
merely be judged by their impact on free speech and equal protection-
as if the Standing Qualifications Clauses did not exist. As a critic of Gla-
zier's approach observes: "Denying ballot access for valid procedural
reasons is not the same as requiring an additional qualification for a con-
gressional office." 2 75 By confusing these two concepts, Glazier would
effectively read the standing qualifications out of the Constitution by al-
lowing the states and Congress to expand and contract such qualifica-
tions at will through the use of the Times, Places and Manner Clause.
The dangers of this approach, so eloquently debated during the Mary-
land Contested Election of 1807, are manifest. As Representative Philip
Key warned on the House floor, this approach would permit the states
"to curtail and rob the people of their elective franchise" 2 76 by denying
those who wish to support incumbents from doing so.
Nor are the states the sole source of that danger. Critics of the "Im-
perial Congress" would do well to remember that the Times, Places and
Manner Clause also applies to Congress. Reading the clause to allow
state-imposed qualifications might tempt the House and Senate to add
their own restrictions, diminishing the franchise even further. Of
course, it might be argued that public pressure would prevent this.
2 77
Then again, public pressure has not prevented congressional turnover
to hover below 10% per election for nearly two decades. It is unclear
why the national legislature should be trusted to determine the rules of
its own members when its forays into this arena since the Wilkes case
have so often been alarming.
B. The Resign-to-Run Cases
Finally, advocates of the Times, Places and Manner Clause theory
275. Memorandum from L. Paige Whitaker, Library of Congress, Constitutionality of
States Limiting Re-Election to Congress 2 (July 6, 1990) (on file with the authors). Whitaker
concludes that Glazier's reliance on Storer and other ballot access cases "seems to be mis-
placed. No case he sets forth involves the question of qualifications for office. Instead,
they all focus on procedural aspects of elections, which have traditionally been within the
purview of state legislation or federal legislation if the Congress deemed it appropriate."
Id.
276. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 913 (1807).
277. Glazier suggests a slightly different scenario: that public pressure would prevent
Congress from repealing state-imposed term limits on its members. Glazier, supra note 29.
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claim support from a second line of cases involving "resign-to-run" re-
quirements for state officeholders. A number of states have passed such
laws (in the form of statutes or state constitutional amendments) to pro-
hibit their high-ranking officials from running for Congress unless they
resign first.278 These decisions are typically distinguishable from the
ballot-access cases in one important respect. Resign-to-run provisions
are not directly concerned with regulating federal election procedures
per se, but rather with ensuring that certain state officeholders who run
for Congress (or, for that matter, for other state offices) do not neglect
their official duties or otherwise harm the state's plenary power in ad-
ministering its government. 2 79 Despite this difference, the test for deter-
mining the constitutionality of resign-to-run provisions is the same as
that used in the ballot-access cases. A resign-to-run provision will be
upheld only if it does not prevent a person from standing for election to
Congress, but merely imposes "indirect burdens" on her candidacy-for
instance, by requiring her to resign her post in the state judiciary or
legislature before seeking a House or Senate seat.280 If the law categori-
cally denies the person's eligibility, or is so burdensome as to have the
same practical effect, the Standing Qualifications Clauses apply.
2 8 1
Glazier bases much of his argument supporting term limitation on
the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Clements v. Flashing.2 8 2 That case
involved two provisions of the Texas Constitution-an ineligibility for
legislature provision,2 83 and a resign-to-run provision.28 4 The ineligibil-
ity provision declared that persons holding state, federal and foreign
government offices were ineligible to serve in the Texas Legislature. 28 5
The provision required the officeholder to complete his or her current
term of office before he or she was eligible to take a seat in the state
legislature. 28 6 The Texas Constitution further provided that if holders
of certain state and county offices whose unexpired terms exceeded one
year became candidates for any state or federal office, "such announce-
ment or such candidacy shall constitute an automatic resignation from
the office then held. ' ' 28 7 The plaintiffs, all subject to this resign-to-run
provision, claimed that they would have run for the state legislature if
not for the provision.28 8 The Court rejected their First and Fourteenth
Amendment claims, arguing that the state's interests outweighed the im-
pediments to their candidacies.
28 9
278. See, e.g.,Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F.2d 1523, 1529 n.4 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1002 (1983) (listing cases holding that state laws rendering officials ineligible for
state office prescribe unconstitutional qualifications).
279. See, e.g., Signorelli v. Evans, 637 F.2d 853, 859 (2d Cir. 1980).
280. See, e.g.,Joyner, 706 F.2d at 1528.
281. Id. at 1528, 1531.
282. 457 U.S. 957 (1982).
283. TEx. CoNsT. art. III, § 19.
284. Id. art. XVI, § 65.
285. Id. art. III, § 19.
286. Clements, 457 U.S. at 960.
287. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 65.
288. Clements, 457 U.S. at 961.
289. Id. at 972-73.
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C/ements did not even mention the Standing Qualifications Clauses.
The state officials involved wanted to run for the Texas legislature. Yet,
although he admits that "[t]he facts of Clements are a bit different than
restricting incumbents in Congress from running for re-election," he
claims the case establishes "the constitutional analysis for anti-incum-
bent laws." '290 He goes on to explain that a state can declare incumbents
who would like to run for Congress ineligible so long as it does not
infringe their free speech or equal protection rights. 29 1 As in his discus-
sion of Storer and Williams, Glazier draws no distinction between laws
entitling state officials to run for Congress so long as they resign first,
and laws barring them from ever doing so. Here, however, he com-
pounds the error by treating all "anti-incumbent laws" alike, as if
Texas's plenary power over its state legislators is coextensive with its
authority over Congress. This assertion probably flows from Glazier's
curious point of departure: that C/ements, the decision that supposedly
"establishes the constitutional analysis for anti-incumbent laws," 29 2
does not even mention the Standing Qualifications Clauses.
Glazier closes by extending his Clements analysis to a pair of federal
appellate court resign-to-run cases, Signorelli v. Evans293 and Joyner v.
Mofford.294 Both cases, he argues, support the idea that states can over-
ride the standing qualifications when necessary to protect the integrity
of congressional elections. 29 5 That integrity is threatened not only
when election procedures are deficient, but when the substantive out-
comes of elections fail to promote "democratic principles. 2 9 6
Glazier quite appropriately speaks in terms of the states' legitimate
interests. Yet he fails to explain that the states can impose only indirect
burdens on potential candidates for Congress even when those interests
are most compelling. Signorelli andJoyner make clear that states cannot
add to, subtract from, or modify the standing qualifications for nomina-
tion or election to Congress-even when the candidates are high-rank-
ing state officeholders who fall under the state's traditional plenary
power.29 7 Because congressional incumbents are not "state officials,"
290. Glazier, supra note 29.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. 637 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1980).
294. 706 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir. 1983).
295. Glazier, supra note 29.
296. Id. Two other commentators, Miles C. Cortez, Jr. and Christopher T. Macaulay,
both Denver attorneys, echo Glazier's view. After reviewing Signorelli andJoyner, as well as
the ballot-access cases, they conclude:
It is undisputed that the states have authority to regulate the manner of elections,
and, in fact, the states have a duty to see that elections are open, competitive and
free from influence.... If evidence establishes that election outcomes are prede-
termined or results guaranteed within two or three percentage points, the state
has an obligation to adopt measures necessary to insure that the people are able
to exercise the franchise in fair and open elections. There is no more basic area
of legitimate and traditional state interest.
Cortez & Macauley, supra note 29, at 2196.
297. See Signorelli, 637 F.2d at 8 58;Joyner, 706 F.2d at 1528.
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the argument for allowing states to prohibit incumbent U.S. Representa-
tives and Senators from standing for re-election is even less persuasive.
In Signorelli, the Second Circuit rejected a challenge to a New York
law requiring state judges to resign from the judiciary before running
for political office. 2 98 The court emphasized that the law placed only an
indirect burden on potential candidates, and did not prevent judges
from seeking federal office.
2 9 9
Similarly, in Joyner, the Ninth Circuit distinguished between state
laws which violate the Standing Qualifications Clauses by barring poten-
tial candidates from seeking federal office, and those that merely regu-
late the conduct of state officeholders by requiring them to resign
first. 30 0 ConradJoyner, a Pima County, Arizona supervisor, brought suit
challenging a resign-to-run provision in the state's constitution.3 0 1 The
provision prohibited various state officials from remaining in office if
they ran for an elected federal position before the final year of their
term.3 0 2 The district court held for the plaintiff, permitting him to
mount an unsuccessful campaign in the Republican primary for Ari-
zona's newly created fifth congressional district.3 0 3 The Ninth Circuit
later reversed, rejectingJoyner's argument that the resign-to-run provi-
sion created an impermissible "fourth" qualification for county supervi-
sors in violation of Article I, Section 2.304
Like Signorelli, Joyner emphasizes that states may use their plenary
power to impose indirect burdens on state officeholders seeking federal
election, but are forbidden by the Standing Qualifications Clauses from
barring any person-even the state's own officials-from running for
Congress. 30 5 Joyner also implicitly rejects the notion that the Times,
Places and Manner Clause permits states to infringe those qualifications
by stealth:
The courts considering challenges to state laws relying on the
Qualifications Clause have distinguished between state provi-
sions which bar a potential candidate from running for federal
office, and those which merely regulate the conduct of state of-
ficeholders. The former category of laws imposes additional
qualifications on candidates and therefore violates the Qualifi-
cations Clause, while the latter category is constitutionally ac-
298. Signorelli, 637 F.2d at 856.
299. Id. at 859. In arguing that indirect burdens on candidates are ordinarily constitu-
tional-particularly when imposed on state officials subject to the state's plenary power-
the Signorelli court referred to the Incompatibility Clause, which provides: "[N]o Person
holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his
Continuance in Office." U.S. COws-T. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. The court observed that the clause
"regulates federal offices even though it indirectly imposes an additional requirement
upon holding Congressional office." 637 F.2d at 859. As with resign-to-run provisions,
the Incompatibility Clause does not prevent officers of the United States from running for
Congress. Rather, it imposes an indirect burden by requiring that they resign first.
300. Joyner, 706 F.2d at 1528.
301. Id. at 1526.
302. Id. at 1525.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 1528.
305. Id.
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ceptable since it merely bars state officeholders from remaining
in their positions should they choose to run for federal office.
The burden of candidacy, imposed by laws of the latter cate-
gory, is indirect and attributable to a desire to regulate state
officeholders and not to impose additional qualifications to
serving in Congress.
30 6
While neitherJoyner nor Signorelli raises the issue of congressional
term limitation, there are at least two reasons why these decisions pre-
vent states from imposing such restrictions under the Times, Places and
Manner Clause. First, state initiatives such as Colorado's categorically
deny incumbents the right to stand for re-election. Joyner and Signorelli,
as well as the ballot-access cases, demonstrate that states may use Article
I, Section 4 only to hinder certain classes of persons from running for
Congress; they cannot prevent any person from standing for election or
re-election. To the extent term limits disqualify congressional incum-
bents, they violate the Standing Qualifications Clauses.
Second, the resign-to-run cases show that states have a special inter-
est in regulating the conduct of their own officials. 30 7 The states' ple-
nary power gives them greater latitude to impose indirect burdens on
state officeholders who, unlike congressional incumbents, are within the
states' immediate control. Nevertheless, if state officials desire to run
for Congress, the Standing Qualifications Clauses do not allow state
governments to disqualify them. The ballot remains open to them, pro-
vided that they resign their state posts or conform to alternative
procedures.
In sum, the ballot-access and resign-to-run cases reveal that the
push for importing a substantive component into the Times, Places and
Manner Clause did not originate in, and is not endorsed by, the courts.
Those who insist that the Clause lets states decide both the manner in
which elections are run, and who may run in them, are really arguing
that the standing qualifications are neither fixed nor exclusive. Such a
conclusion cannot be supported by either case law or the deliberations
of the Constitutional Convention.
CONCLUSION
The debate over congressional term limitation is not new. The Fed-
eralists and Anti-Federalists fought it out at the Philadelphia Convention
more than two centuries ago. The Federalists prevailed, defeating all
efforts to limit congressional terms. In the intervening years, several
306. Id.
307. In Joyner, the Ninth Circuit accepted the state's argument that the resign-to-run
provision was essential for four reasons: 1) to encourage elected state officials to devote
themselves exclusively to the duties of their office; 2) to reduce the possibility that officials
will simply use their state office as a political "stepping stone;" 3) to guard against abuse of
office before and after the election; and 4) to protect the expectations of the electorate in
voting a candidate into state office. Id. at 1532. Thus, the State of Arizona did not hinder
Joyner's candidacy in order to control the substantive outcome of his congressional cam-
paign. Instead, Arizona made it more difficult for him and other state officials to run for
federal office because it wanted to protect the integrity of its own government.
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states restricted the tenure of their own officeholders. At the federal
level, the Twenty-Second Amendment now limits the President to a
maximum eight years of service. But neither Congress nor the states
have used the constitutional amendment process to limit congressional
terms. While the courts have never squarely addressed the issue, Powell
and a wealth of historical evidence show that the Standing Qualifications
Clauses are the exclusive criteria for congressional service. State meas-
ures like Colorado's 1990 initiative add another qualification-lack of
incumbency-to those enumerated in the Constitution.
Notwithstanding the overwhelming historical evidence and case law,
proponents of congressional term limitation rely on two basic argu-
ments to justify the constitutionality of their proposals. Neither, how-
ever, is persuasive. The argument which relies on the Tenth
Amendment fails because the Tenth Amendment cannot reserve a
power to the states or the people when that power has already been
delegated to the federal government in the Standing Qualifications
Clauses. The argument that the Times, Places and Manner Clause per-
mits Congress and the states to impose substantive requirements on fed-
eral officeholders is equally unpersuasive. Federal courts have
repeatedly held that this Clause permits states to regulate election pro-
cedures, such as political party registration, and not the substantive re-
quirements of office-holding. Using the Clause as a textual basis for
declaring congressional incumbents ineligible for re-election would per-
mit states to modify the standing qualifications through the backdoor-
in other words, to achieve precisely what the Constitution forbids.
Thus, while no court has faced the question directly, the Colorado
initiative and others like it are unlikely to pass constitutional muster in
the U.S. Supreme Court. This possibility has not deterred the term limi-
tation movement's political campaign. If anything, the fact that the issue
is technically still an open question has energized the movement's lead-
ers. The remarks of one of the movement's national spokespersons,
Colorado State Senator Terry Considine, illustrates this point. Consi-
dine, who chaired the successful 1990 initiative campaign in Colorado,
admits it might be unconstitutional for a state to limit the number of
terms its members of Congress may serve. A brochure distributed to
voters by his campaign organization states: "The provision limiting the
terms of Colorado's U.S. Senators and Representatives could, of course,
be challenged in the courts. But that's not bad if it is the only way we
can find out for sure if a state does have the power to limit terms."130 8 In
other words, a constitutional showdown is not only expected, but
desired.
Considine is certainly correct in stating that the constitutionality of
the Colorado initiative is officially in limbo. It is unclear whether the
federal courts will accept jurisdiction before the issue ripens-that is,
before the Secretary of State declares an incumbent ineligible to have
308. TERM LIMITATIONS, supra note 22.
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her name on the ballot because she has served a maximum of twelve
years. Even if the courts were to consider the issue sooner, a final deci-
sion may still be years away. Meanwhile, initiative campaigns are report-
edly underway in nearly two dozen states by term limit organizations
hoping to follow Colorado's lead. But supporters of these groups are
likely to wind up on the losing side of any constitutional test case they
may help to create.
No observer of the American political scene can doubt the serious-
ness of the political mood that underlies the term limitation movement.
Voters are justifiably concerned about the rise of the "professional poli-
tician" in Congress. They see fewer and fewer incumbents going down
to defeat at the ballot box. The public is demanding immediate reform
of the electoral process. While changes in campaign finance laws and
Congress's institutional procedures, such as its committee structure,
hold some hope for improvement, only term limitation purports to offer
a quick-fix to the problem. Hence its popular appeal.
But popular appeal is no substitute for constitutionality.3 0 9 Unfor-
tunately, the term limitation movement, confronted by what it sees as a
Congress that frustrates the will of the people, has ignored the proper
constitutional procedure for achieving its objectives. If the American
people truly want congressional term limitation, they must amend the
Constitution.
309. By no means do we suggest that the popularity of these proposals among voters is
therefore unimportant. On the contrary, the term limitation movement might well have
strategic reasons for sponsoring state initiatives that are likely to fail in the courts. Several
commentators have predicted that if enough states follow Colorado's lead, Congress will
eventually bow to public pressure and approve a constitutional amendment limiting the
terms of its members. Crane, supra note 3, at 2.
Similarly, Congressional Quarterly has suggested that the term limitation movement
"may reshape congressional politics without ever imposing term limits by law .... For
example, a pledge to limit one's terms could be to the politics of the near future what the
no-new-taxes pledge was to the politics of the recent past." Elving, supra note 7, at 3101.
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